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I study the coexistence of formal and informal ﬁnance in underdeveloped credit markets.
Formal banks have access to unlimited funds but are unable to control the use of credit.
Informal lenders can prevent non-diligent behavior but often lack the needed capital. The
model implies that formal and informal credit can be either complements or substitutes.
The model also explains why weak legal institutions raise the prevalence of informal ﬁ-
nance in some markets and reduce it in others, why ﬁnancial market segmentation persists,
and why informal interest rates can be highly variable within the same sub economy.
JEL classiﬁcation: O12; O16; O17; D40.
Keywords: Credit markets; Financial development; Institutions; Market structure.
1 Introduction
Formal and informal ﬁnance coexist in markets with weak legal institutions and low levels
of income (Germidis et al., 1991; Nissanke and Aryeetey, 1998).1 Poor people either obtain
informal credit or borrow from both sectors at the same time. Banerjee and Duﬂo (2007)
document that 95 percent of all borrowers living below $2 a day in Hyderabad, India access
IGIER and Department of Economics, Bocconi University. Email: andreas.madestam@unibocconi.it. I
am grateful to Tore Ellingsen and Mike Burkart for their advice and encouragement. I also thank Abhijit
Banerjee, Chlo´ e Le Coq, Avinash Dixit, Giovanni Favara, Maitreesh Ghatak, B˚ ard Harstad, Eliana La Ferrara,
Patrick Legros, Rocco Macchiavello, Matthias Messner, Elena Paltseva, Fausto Panunzi, Tomas Sj¨ ostr¨ om, David
Str¨ omberg, Jakob Svensson, Jean Tirole, Robert Townsend, Adel Varghese, and Fabrizio Zilibotti for valuable
comments, as well as seminar participants at Bocconi University (Milan), CEPR workshop on Globalization
and Contracts: Trade, Finance and Development (Paris), EEA Congress 2004 (Madrid), ENTER Jamboree 2004
(Barcelona), EUDNconference2007(Paris), FinancialIntermediationResearchSociety’sConferenceonBanking,
Corporate Finance and Intermediation 2006 (Shanghai), IIES (Stockholm), IUI (Stockholm), Lawless Finance:
Workshop in Economics and Law (Milan), LSE (London), NEUDC Conference 2004 (Montr´ eal), Nordic Con-
ference in Development Economics (Gothenburg), SITE (Stockholm), Stockholm School of Economics, Swedish
Central Bank (Stockholm), and University of Amsterdam.
1 Germidis et al. and Nissanke and Aryeetey report that loans made by family, landlords, professional mon-
eylenders, shopkeepers, and traders, account for between one third and three quarters of total credit in Asia and
Sub-Saharan Africa.
1informal sources even when banks are present.2 Meanwhile, Das-Gupta et al. (1989) provide
evidence from Delhi, India where 70 percent of all borrowers get credit from both sectors at the
same time.3 Such ﬁnancing arrangements raise a number of issues. Why do some borrowers
take informal loans despite the existence of formal banks, while others obtain funds from both
ﬁnancialsectors simultaneously? Also, is thereacausal linkbetweeninstitutionaldevelopment,
level of income, and informal lending? If so, precisely what is the connection?
Although empirically important, the coexistence of formal and informal ﬁnance has not
received as much attention as recent theoretical work on microﬁnance (Banerjee et al., 1994;
Ghatak and Guinnane, 1999; Rai and Sj¨ ostr¨ om, 2004). In this paper, I provide a theory of
informal ﬁnance, whose main assumptions can be summarized as follows.
First, in line with the literature on the effect of institutions on economic performance (La
Porta et al., 1997, 1998; Djankov et al., 2007; Visaria, 2009), I view legal protection of banks as
essential to ensure availability of credit. To this end, I assume that borrowers may divert their
bank loan (ex ante moral hazard) and that weaker contract enforcement increases the value of
such diversion, which limits the supply of funds. By contrast, informal lenders are able to
monitor borrowers by offering credit to a group of known clients where social ties and social
sanctions induce investment (Aleem 1990; Udry, 1990; Ghate et al., 1992).4
Second, while banks have access to unlimited funds, informal lenders can be resource con-
strained. In a survey of ﬁnancial markets in developing countries, Conning and Udry (2007)
write that “ﬁnancial intermediation may be held up not for lack of locally informed agents...but
for lack of local intermediary capital” (Conning and Udry, 2007, p. 2892). Consequently, land-
lords, professionalmoneylenders, shopkeepers, andtraderswhoofferinformalcreditfrequently
acquire bank funds to service borrowers’ ﬁnancing needs. Ghate et al. (1992), Rahman (1992),
and Irfan et al. (1999) remark that formal credit totals three quarters of the informal sector’s
liabilities in many Asian countries.5
Third, less developed economies are often characterized by an absence of competition. In
particular, formal sector banks typically have some market power (see Barth et al., 2004 and
Beck et al., 2004 for contemporary support and Wang, 2008 and Rajan and Ramcharan, forth-
2 See Siamwalla et al. (1990) for similar ﬁndings from Thailand.
3 See Conning (2001) and Gin´ e (2007) for related support from Chile and Thailand.
4 For further evidence of the personal character of informal lending see Udry (1994), Steel et al. (1997), and La
Ferrara (2003) for the case of Africa and Bell (1990) for the case of Asia. See also Besley et al. (1993, 1994) for
theoretical work on rotating savings and credit associations stressing the importance of social sanctions. Anderson
et al. (2009) and Karlan (2005, 2007) provide related empirical support. As in Besley and Coate (1995), my aim
is not to explain informal lenders’ monitoring ability, but to understand its implications.
5 Conning and Udry (2007) further write that ”the trader-intermediary usually employs a combination of her
own equity together with funds leveraged from less informed outside intermediaries such as banks...[leading]
to the development of a system of bills of exchange...[used by the] outside creditor...as security” (Conning and
Udry, 2007, pp. 2863-2864). See Harriss (1983), Bouman and Houtman (1988), Graham et al (1988), Floro and
Yotopoulos (1991), and Mansuri (2006) for additional evidence of informal lenders accessing the formal sector
in India, Niger, Pakistan, Philippines, and Sri Lanka. See also Haney (1914), Gates (1977), Biggs (1993), Toby
(1991), Teranishi (2005, 2007), and Wang (2008) for historical support from Japan, Taiwan, and the United States.
2coming for historical evidence).6
In this setting, I show that informal ﬁnance increases poor people’s access to credit. Banks
lend lessto poor borrowers asthe loan accountsfor a substantial shareof the neededinvestment.
The resulting large interest payment leaves them a net return below the payoff from diverting
bank funds and ﬁnance dries up. Meanwhile, informal lenders’ monitoring advantage facili-
tates lending. Agency-free informal credit also improves the investment return by lowering the
relative gain of misusing formal capital. Anticipating this, banks extend more funds. Informal
ﬁnance thus complements banks by permitting for larger formal sector loans.
Informal lenders’ monitoring ability also helps banks to reduce agency cost by allowing
them to channel credit through the informal sector. When lending directly to poor people,
banks share part of the surplus with the borrowers to keep them from diverting. Extending
credit through informal lenders that are rich enough to have a stake in the ﬁnancial outcome
minimizes the surplus shared. In contrast to the previous argument, the credit market becomes
segmented as informal ﬁnance substitutes for banks and limits borrowers’ direct bank access.
The extent to which informal ﬁnance complements or substitutes for bank credit depends on
banks’ bargaining power. If formal banks are competitive, borrowers obtain capital from both
ﬁnancial sectors, with poor informal lenders accessing banks for extra funds. By contrast, if
formal lenders have some market power, sufﬁciently rich (bank-ﬁnanced) informal lenders are
borrowers’ only source of credit. This is because borrowers’ and informal lenders’ joint return
is maximized if both take competitive bank loans, while market power and subsequent credit
market segmentation allows the formal institution to reduce agency costs.
My predictions are broadly consistent with existing data on formal-informal sector inter-
actions. Several accounts from South America illustrate the complementarity between formal
and informal ﬁnance. Funding by traders and input suppliers serves to assure banks of farmers’
creditworthiness and facilitates bank access (Glover and Kusterer, 1990; Campion, 2006; Wit-
tlinger and Tuesta, 2006). Harriss (1983), Floro and Yotopoulos (1991), and Rahman (1992)
further document how formal lenders in India, Philippines, and Bangladesh deal with rich as
opposed to poor farmers, since the richer clients have the assets required for leverage. The
wealthier farmers then forward bank credit to poorer farmers. Historical evidence from nine-
teenth century United States (Wang, 2008) also shows how increased bank competition allowed
poor farmers and artisans to partially switch from informal credit provided by wealthier bank-
funded merchants, to direct bank ﬁnance. Contemporary data echo these ﬁndings. Gin´ e (2007)
observes that borrowers in rural Thailand are less likely to access the informal sector exclu-
sively when bank competition increases. (See Section 3.4 for an extensive discussion.)
The characterization of the aggregate demand for and supply of formal and informal credit
allows me to address additional issues. For example, weaker legal institutions increase the
prevalence of informal credit if borrowers obtain money from both ﬁnancial sectors, while
the opposite is true if informal lenders supply all capital. This rationalizes Dabla-Norris and
6 Beck et al. report a positive and signiﬁcant relation between measures of bank competition and GDP per capita.
3Koeda’s (2008) and Chavis et al.’s (2009) ﬁnding that the relationship between institutional
quality and informal credit can go either way. Moreover, the results add insight to the evidence
reviewed by Banerjee (2003) of large variation in informal lending rates within the same sub
economy and across borrowers with similar debt capacity. For instance, the interest rates of
credit-constrained informal lenders increase as legal institutions deteriorate and credit markets
become segmented.
Persistence of ﬁnancial underdevelopment, in the form of market segmentation, can also
be understood within the model. Wealthier informal lenders (and banks) prefer the segmented
outcome that arises with bank market power, as it softens competition between the ﬁnancial
sectors. This resonates with Rajan and Zingales’ (2003) work on incumbent ﬁnancial institu-
tions support for ﬁnancial repression to maintain status quo. It is further in line with Rajan
and Ramcharan (forthcoming). They ﬁnd that banking in the early twentieth century United
States was more concentrated in counties with rich landowners, who often engaged in lending
to farmers. Finally, my analysis also sheds some light on credit market policy by distinguishing
between the efﬁciency effects of wealth transfers, credit subsidies, and legal reform.
The paper relates to three strands of the literature. First, it connects to theories stressing
informal lenders’ monitoring advantage over banks. Banerjee (2003) explores the interplay
between informal lenders’ monitoring ability, monitoring cost, and borrower wealth to explain
the variability in informal interest rates, but does not explicitly consider the presence of banks.
The papers that account for a formal sector either view informal lenders as bank competitors
or as a channel of bank funds (Bell et al., 1997; Floro and Ray, 1997; Hoff and Stiglitz, 1998;
Jain, 1999; Jain and Mansuri, 2003). While this paper shares some of these ideas there are
a number of differences. First, unlike previous work I study the role of legal institutions and
bank market power. Second, earlier contributions do not clearly distinguish whether informal
lenders compete with banks or primarily engage in channeling funds. Third, competition theo-
ries cannot account for bank lending to the informal sector or for variation in informal interest
rates.7 Fourth, channeling theories fail to address the agency problem between the formal and
the informal lender. My model explains why informal lenders take bank credit in each of these
instances, making competition and channeling a choice variable in a framework where moni-
toring problems exist between banks, informal lenders, and borrowers. The theory thus extends
and reconciles earlier work while deriving endogenous constraints on informal lending.8
The second line of related literature studies the interaction between modern and traditional
sectors to rationalize persistence of personal exchange (Kranton 1996; Banerjee and Newman,
1998; Besley and Ghatak, 2009; Rajan, 2009). While Kranton and Banerjee and Newman
7 Jain and Mansuri do consider the effect of the formal sector on informal lending rates, but not informal lenders’
intermediary function.
8 My model also differs from other intermediation theories, such as Holmstr¨ om and Tirole (1997), who cannot
explain why borrowers and informal lenders simultaneously access banks. Moreover, while ﬁnancial arrange-
ments in my model have distinct efﬁciency and distributional features, certiﬁcation (investors and banks lend to
borrowers) and intermediation (investors deposit funds in banks) are outcome equivalent in Holmstr¨ om and Tirole.
4focus on how market imperfections give rise to institutions that (may) impede the development
of markets, Besley and Ghatak and Rajan (like this paper) show how rent protection can hamper
reform. MyresultsalsomatchBiaisandMariotti’s(2009)andvonLilienfeld-Toaletal.’s(2009)
ﬁndings of heterogeneous effects of improved creditor rights across rich and poor agents.
Finally, the paper links to research emphasizing market structure as an important cause of
contractual frictions in less developed economies (Petersen and Rajan, 1995; Mookherjee and
Ray, 2002; Kranton and Swamy, 2008). As in Petersen and Rajan and Mookherjee and Ray, I
study the effects of market power on credit availability, while Kranton and Swamy investigate
the implications on hold-up between exporters and textile producers.
The model builds on Burkart and Ellingsen’s (2004) analysis of trade credit in a competitive
banking and input supplier market.9 The bank and the borrower in their model are analogous to
the competitive formal lender and the borrower in my setting. However, their input supplier and
my informal lender differ substantially.10 Moreover, I investigate bank sector market power.
In the next section I introduce the model then in Section 3 present equilibrium outcomes
and supporting empirical evidence. Section 4 deals with cross-sectional predictions. Section 5
examines persistence of market segmentation. Section 6 studies informal interest rates. Section
7 explores economic policy. I conclude by discussing robustness issues and point to possible
extensions. Formal proofs are relegated to the Appendix.
2 Model
Consider a credit market consisting of risk-neutral entrepreneurs (for example, farmers, house-
holds, or small ﬁrms), banks (who provide formal ﬁnance), and moneylenders (who provide
informal ﬁnance). The entrepreneur is endowed with observable wealth wE  0. She has
access to a deterministic production function, Q(I), where I is the investment volume. The
production function is concave, twice continuously differentiable, and satisﬁes Q(0) = 0 and
Q0 (0) = ¥. In a perfect credit market with interest rate r, the entrepreneur would like to
attain ﬁrst-best investment given by Q0 (I) = 1 + r. However, she lacks sufﬁcient wealth,
wE < I (r), and thus turns to the bank and/or the moneylender for the remaining funds.11
Whilebankshaveanexcess supplyoffunds, creditislimitedastheentrepreneuris unableto
commit to invest all available resources into her project. Speciﬁcally, I assume that she may use
(part of) the assets to generate nonveriﬁable private beneﬁts. Non-diligent behavior resulting
in diversion of funds denotes any activity that is less productive than investment, for example,
9 Burkart and Ellingsen assume that it is less proﬁtable for the borrower to divert inputs than to divert cash.
Thus, input suppliers may lend when banks are limited due to potential agency problems.
10 While the input supplier and the (competitive) bank offer a simple debt contract, the informal lender offers a
more sophisticated project-speciﬁc contract, where the investment and the subsequent repayment are determined
using Nash Bargaining. More importantly, the informal lender is assumed to be able to ensure that investment is
guaranteed, something that the trade creditor is unable to do.
11 I assume that the entrepreneur accepts the ﬁrst available contract if indifferent between the contracts offered.
5using available resources for consumption or ﬁnancial saving. The diversion activity yields
beneﬁt f < 1 for every unit diverted. Creditor vulnerability is captured by f (where a higher
f implies weaker legal protection of banks).12 While investment is unveriﬁable, the outcome
of the entrepreneur’s project in terms of output and/or sales revenue may be veriﬁed. The
entrepreneur thus faces the following trade-off: either she invests and realizes the net beneﬁt
of production after repaying the bank (and possibly the moneylender), or she proﬁts directly
from diverting the bank funds (the entrepreneur still pays the moneylender if she has taken an
informal loan). In the case of partial diversion, any remaining returns are repaid to the bank in
full. The bank does not to derive any beneﬁt from resources that are diverted.
Informal lenders are endowed with observable wealth wM  0 and have a monitoring ad-
vantage over banks such that credit granted is fully invested. The informal sector contains a va-
riety of lenders including input suppliers, landlords, merchants, professional moneylenders, and
traders. Through their occupation, they attract different borrowers (for example, trader/farmer
and landlord/tenant) that may give some lenders a particular enforcement advantage.13 The im-
portant and uniting feature, however, is the ability to induce diligent behavior irrespective of the
quality of the legal system. (The moneylender represents all informal lenders with this trait.) To
keep the model tractable, I restrict informal lenders’ occupational choice to lending (additional
sources of income do not alter the main insights). For simplicity, monitoring cost is assumed to
zero.14 The moneylender’s superior knowledge of local borrowers grants him exclusivity (but
not necessarily market power, see below).15 In the absence of contracting problems between the
moneylender and the entrepreneur, the moneylender maximizes the joint surplus derived from
the investment project and divides the proceeds using Nash Bargaining. A contract is given by
a pair (B,R) 2 R2
+, where B is the amount borrowed by the entrepreneur and R the repayment
obligation. Finally, if the moneylender requires additional funding he turns to a bank.
Following the same logic as above, I assume that the moneylender cannot commit to lend
his bank loan and that diversion yields private beneﬁts equivalent of f < 1 for every unit
diverted. While lending is unveriﬁable, the outcome of the moneylender’s operation may be
veriﬁed. The moneylender thus faces the following trade-off: either he lends the bank credit
to the entrepreneur, realizing the net-lending proﬁt after compensating the bank, or he beneﬁts
directly from diverting the bank loan. In the case of partial diversion, the moneylender repays
the remaining amount to the bank in full. Banks do not beneﬁt from assets that are diverted.
Finally, banks have access to unlimited funds at a constant unit cost of zero. They offer a
12 Bad legal protection can be due either to poor quality of the law or to ineffective enforcement (Pistor et al.,
2000). I abstract from such differences and focus on the ultimate impact of the law.
13 A landlord, for example, may also engage in the linking of credit and land transactions to increase tenants’
work effort, as in Braverman and Stiglitz (1982).
14 This is not to diminish the importance of informal lenders’ monitoring cost (see Banerjee, 2003). However, the
cost is set to zero as it makes no difference in the analysis that follows (unless sufﬁciently prohibitive to prevent
banks or entrepreneurs from dealing with the informal sector altogether).
15 The assumption that borrowers obtain funds from at most one informal source has empirical support see, for
example, Aleem (1990), Siamwalla et al. (1990), and Berensmann (2002).
6contract (Li,Di), where Li is the loan and Di the interest payment, with subscripts i 2 fE, Mg
indicating entrepreneur (E) and moneylender (M). When f is equal to zero, legal protection of
banks is perfect and even a penniless entrepreneur and/or moneylender could raise an amount




Q(I (0))   I (0)
I (0)
. (1)
In words, the marginal beneﬁt of diversion yields higher utility than the average rate of return
to ﬁrst-best investment at zero rate of interest [henceforth I (0) = I].
The timing is as follows:
1. Banks offer a contract, (Li,Di), to the entrepreneur and the moneylender, respectively.
2. The moneylender offers a contract, (B,R), to the entrepreneur.
3. The moneylender makes his lending/diversion decision.
4. The entrepreneur makes her investment/diversion decision.
5. Repayments are made.
To distinguish formal from informal ﬁnance, I assume that banks are unable to condition their
contracts on the moneylender’s contract offer, an assumption empirically supported by Gin´ e
(2007).16 If not, the entrepreneur could obtain an informal loan and then approach the bank.
Bank credit would then depend on the informal loan and the subsequent certain investment.
3 Equilibrium
I begin by analyzing each ﬁnancial sector in isolation. This helps understand how the agency
problem in the formal bank market generates credit rationing. It also highlights how the provi-
sion of incentives and the quality of the legal system affect lending across the two sectors.
3.1 Benchmark
Thereisfreeentryinthebankmarket. Withoutlossofgenerality, IfollowBurkartandEllingsen
(2004) and focus on contracts of the form f(LE,(1+ r) LE)gLE¯ LE, where LE is the loan,
(1+ r) LE the repayment, and ¯ LE the credit limit.17 The contract implies that a borrower may
withdraw any amount of funds until the credit limit binds. For simplicity, entrepreneurs borrow
from one bank at a time. Following a Bertrand argument, competition drives equilibrium bank
proﬁt to zero.18 Nonetheless, credit is limited as investment of bank funds cannot be ensured.
16 See also Bell et al. (1997) for evidence in support of the assumed sequence of events.
17 In a similar setting, Burkart and Ellingsen (2002) show that overdraft facilities are optimal contracts.
18 Some developing credit markets have a sizable share of state-owned banks. I make no assumption on bank
ownership but do assume that proﬁt maximization governs bank behavior. While state ownership can be less
efﬁcient (La Porta et al., 2002) this does not bar proﬁt maximization as a useful approximation. In Sapienza’s
(2004) study of Italian banks, state-owned enterprises charge less but increase interest rates when markets become
more concentrated, consistent with proﬁt-maximizing behavior.
7Speciﬁcally (solving for the subgame-perfect equilibrium outcome), the entrepreneur chooses
the amount of funds to invest, I, and the amount of credit, LE, by maximizing
UE = maxf0,Q(I)   (1+ r) LEg + f(wE + LE   I)
subject to
wE + LE  I,
¯ LE  LE.
The ﬁrst part of the expression is the proﬁt from investing, accounting for limited liability.
The second part denotes the gain from diversion. The full expression is maximized subject to
available funds and the credit limit. It turns out that neither partial investment nor diversion is
optimal. Investing yields at least 1 + r on every dollar invested, while diversion leaves only
f. If the entrepreneur plans to divert resources, there is no reason to invest either borrowed or
internal funds as the bank would claim all of the returns. Hence, the choice is essentially binary;
either the entrepreneur chooses to invest all the money or she diverts the maximum possible.
The entrepreneur acts diligently if the contract satisﬁes the incentive constraint
Q(wE + Lu
E)   (1+ r) Lu
E  f(wE + ¯ LE), (2)
where Lu
E = minfI (r)   wE, ¯ LEg. Either the entrepreneur borrows and invests efﬁciently,
or she exhausts the credit line extended by the bank. As there is no default in equilibrium, the
only equilibrium interest rate consistent with zero proﬁt is r = 0.
At low wealth, the temptation to divert resources is too large to allow a loan in support of
ﬁrst best. In this case, the credit limit is given by the binding incentive constraint
Q(wE + ¯ LE)   ¯ LE = f(wE + ¯ LE). (3)
As an increase in wealth improves the return to investment for a given loan size, the credit line
and the investment rise with wealth. Similarly, better creditor protection (a lower f) increases
the opportunity costs of diversion, making larger repayment obligations and thus higher credit
limits incentive compatible. When the entrepreneur is sufﬁciently wealthy the constraint no
longer binds and the ﬁrst-best outcome is obtained.
Proposition 1 For all f > f
¯
, there is a threshold wc
E > 0 such that entrepreneurs with wealth
below wc
E invest I < I, credit (LE) and investment (I) increase in wE, and LE and I decrease
in creditor vulnerability (f). If wE  wc
E then I is invested.
Like most agency models, the theory delivers the basic insight that less leveraged borrowers are
better credit risks (as in the costly effort framework).19 The current formulation’s advantage is
the direct correspondence between institutional efﬁciency and the degree of credit rationing.
19 See Banerjee (2003) for a discussion of the similarity across different moral hazard models of credit rationing.
8If the entrepreneur borrows from the informal sector, the moneylender maximizes the sur-
plus of the investment project, Q(wE + B)   B. Let B denote the loan size that solves the
ﬁrst-order condition Q0 (wE + B)   1  0. Absent contracting frictions, the efﬁcient outcome
B = I   wE is obtained if the moneylender is sufﬁciently wealthy, while the outcome is
constrained efﬁcient otherwise, with B = wM < I   wE. Excess moneylender funds are
deposited in the bank earning a zero rate of interest. Given B, the entrepreneur and the mon-
eylender bargain over how to share the project gains using available resources wE + B, with
wM  B. If they disagree, investment fails and each party is left with her/his wealth or po-
tential loan. In case of agreement, the moneylender offers a contract where the equilibrium




fQ(wE + B)   t   wEg
a ft   Bg
1 a
= (1  a)[Q(wE + B)   wE] + aB,
where a 2 (0,1) represents the degree of competition in the informal sector (competition
increases if a is high).20 As the evidence of the extent of informal lenders’ market power is
inconclusive, no a priori assumption is made on a.21
3.2 Formal and Informal Finance
Financial sector coexistence not only allows poor borrowers to raise funds from two sources,
it also permits informal lenders to access banks. This introduces additional trade-offs: while
(agency-free) informal credit improves the incentives of the entrepreneur, banks now have to
consider the possibility of diversion on the part of the entrepreneur and the moneylender.
Proposition 1 indicated that rising wealth enables banks to lend more extensively. When
banks and moneylenders both supply credit, informal capital increases the residual return to the
entrepreneur’s project with the end effect equivalent to an increase in internal funds. Informal
ﬁnance thus incentivizes entrepreneurs as it makes them less prone to divert bank credit. Before




Q(I)   (I   wi)
I . (4)
Asthemoneylender’swealthfacilitatestheentrepreneur’sconstraint(andviceversa), thisneeds
to be incorporated. The condition ensures that diversion beneﬁts exceed the average return to
an investment I, accounting for entrepreneurial or informal lender wealth. If not, a penniless
entrepreneur and/or moneylender could support ﬁrst best.
20 If there is agreement and Q(wE + B)   R  Q(wE), the entrepreneur receives Q(wE) leaving the residual
Q(wE + B)   Q(wE) to the moneylender.
21 Informal ﬁnance has been documented as competitive (Adams et al., 1984), monopolistically competitive
(Aleem, 1990), and as a monopoly (Bhaduri, 1977).
9Solving backwards and starting with the entrepreneur’s incentive constraint yields
Q(wE + Lu
E + B)   Lu
E   R(B)  f(wE + ¯ LE), (5)
where Lu
E = minfI   wE   B, ¯ LEg. The only modiﬁcation from above is that the amount
borrowed from the moneylender, B, is prudently invested.22
If the moneylender needs extra funds, he turns to a bank and chooses the amount to lend to
the entrepreneur, B, and the amount of credit, LM, to satisfy the following incentive constraint
R(wM + Lu
M)   Lu
M  f(wM + ¯ LM), (6)









I   wM   wE   Lu
E, ¯ LM
	
. The left-hand side of the inequality is the moneylen-
der’s net-lending proﬁt, while the right-hand side is the return from borrowing a maximum
amount and then diverting all available assets.23
It remains to determine the Nash Bargaining outcome. As before, I have
R(B)
 = (1  a)[Q(wE + Lu
E + B)   Lu
E   wE] + aB, (7)
the only difference is that each party is compensated for the cost of bank borrowing. I now
describe resulting outcomes.
Poor entrepreneurs and poor moneylenders will be credit rationed by the bank as their stake
in the ﬁnancial outcome is too small. Since the surplus of the bank transaction accrues entirely
to the entrepreneur and the moneylender, the residual return to an investment increases if both
take bank credit. Speciﬁcally, the entrepreneur exhausts her bank credit line and borrows the
maximum amount made available by the moneylender. Similarly, the moneylender utilizes all
available bank funds and his own capital to service the entrepreneur. Hence, the credit limits
solve the following binding constraints of the entrepreneur and the moneylender
a[Q(I)   ¯ LE   ¯ LM   wM] + (1  a)wE = f(wE + ¯ LE) (8)
and
(1  a)[Q(I)   ¯ LE   ¯ LM   wE] + awM = f(wM + ¯ LM), (9)
with I = wE + ¯ LE + wM + ¯ LM. For the entrepreneur to take informal credit, a has to satisfy
a > ˆ a, where ˆ a > 0 denotes the point of indifference between exclusive bank borrowing and
obtaining bank and moneylender funds. 24
22 Since returns are claimed by the bank even if the bank’s credit has been diverted, it is never optimal for the
entrepreneur to borrow from the moneylender while diverting bank funds.
23 Similar to the entrepreneur, the moneylender faces a binary choice. If he decides to lend all his bank funds in
order to repay in full, he earns at least 1, while diversion grants him only f. If he lends too little to repay the bank
loan in full, he may as well divert all funds, since additional returns are claimed by the bank.
24 The threshold, ˆ a, solves a[Q(I)   ¯ LE   ¯ LM   wM] + (1  a)wE = Q(wE + ¯ LE)   ¯ LE.
10For a wealthier moneylender, the net return from extending a loan in support of ﬁrst-best
investment beats the diversion gain, and his incentive constraint becomes slack. In this instance,
themoneylender makesno proﬁt. To seethis, suppose thatthe project’ssurplus exceedsthesum
of the entrepreneur’s and the moneylender’s outside option (equivalent of diverting bank funds
and earning the moneylender’s wealth). The bank can then offer the entrepreneur more credit
which increases her value of diversion and reduces the surplus shared with the moneylender.
If the surplus is positive, the entrepreneur refrains from diversion in equilibrium, while the
moneylender concedes by lowering his price of credit.25 This continues until the agents obtain
their respective outside options. Hence, the entrepreneur’s credit limit solves, independent of
the bargaining outcome
Q(wE + ¯ LE + wM + LM)   ¯ LE   LM   wM = f(wE + ¯ LE), (10)
while the investment is given by I = I.26 If the moneylender is rich enough to self ﬁnance
large parts (or the entire amount) of ﬁrst best he no longer acquires bank funds. Here the en-
trepreneur borrows from a bank and a self-ﬁnanced moneylender. The entrepreneur’s incentive
constraint is still determined by (10), with LM + wM replaced by B  wM and I = I.27
Finally, a sufﬁciently rich entrepreneur resorts to the bank alone, with I = I.
Proposition 2 (i) For all f > f
¯
(wi) and wE < wc
E, entrepreneurs borrow from a bank and
a bank-ﬁnanced moneylender and invest I < I if wM < w
¯
c









Entrepreneurs borrow from a bank and a self-ﬁnanced moneylender and invest I if wM  ¯ wc
M.
(ii) Entrepreneurs borrow exclusively from a bank and invest I if wE  wc
E and f > f
¯
(wi).
When weak institutions constrain banks, informal ﬁnance allows poor borrowers (with wealth
below wc
E) to invest more than if banks were the only source of funds. Meanwhile, en-
trepreneurs with wealth above wc
E are unaffected as they can satisfy their needs with bank
credit alone. To better understand how the informal sector’s asset base matters, I explore how
the credit lines change with the underlying parameters.
Corollary 1 (Comparative Statics) For wM < w
¯
c
M, wE < wc
E, and (i) all a, credit (¯ LE)
increases in entrepreneurs’ wealth (wE), decreases in creditor vulnerability (f), and is non-
decreasing in moneylenders’ wealth (wM), while ¯ LM increases in wM; (ii) all a > ˆ a, ¯ LM is
nondecreasing in wE and decreases in f; (iii) a = ˆ a, ¯ LM decreases in wE and is indeterminate








, wE < wc
E, and all a, ¯ LE increases in wE,
is independent of wM, and decreases in f, while LM decreases in wi and increases in f.
25 The entrepreneur never takes informal credit while diverting bank funds, as additional returns are claimed by
the bank. Opportunistic behavior on the part of the entrepreneur thus leads to loss of business for the moneylender.
26 The entrepreneur’s credit limit cannot be lower in equilibrium. Otherwise, there would exist a bank contract
with a lower limit and a positive informal interest rate preferred by the bank as well as the moneylender.
27 The entrepreneur could satisfy her needs by only taking informal credit but borrows from both sectors as I
assume that she accepts the ﬁrst available contract if indifferent. The same conclusion follows if moneylenders’
monitoring cost was positive and constant returns to scale.
11A rise in wealth allows poor entrepreneurs and poor moneylenders to take additional bank credit




E and a 2 (ˆ a,1)]. In particular, a
boost in moneylender wealth makes the entrepreneur’s investment of a given bank loan more
valuable than the diversion of the loan, inducing an increase in the entrepreneur’s bank credit.
The result hinges on the informal sector’s ability to enforce the transaction, not on being better
at attracting bank funds. Indeed, worse legal protection raises the proﬁtability of diversion rela-
tive to lending the bank credit, limiting the moneylender’s bank access. At ﬁrst best, additional
informal sector wealth becomes less important. As the entrepreneur invests I, a higher wM has
no effect on her incentives.28 Unlike above, weaker legal institutions increase the importance
of the informal sector as diversion no longer tempts the moneylender (LM increases in f).
Since sufﬁciently rich moneylenders earn the opportunity cost of funds, informal sector




E. Although equilibrium outcomes re-
main the same for ˆ a  a  1, some of the variation is muted. If the moneylender is a
monopolist (a = ˆ a), the entrepreneur’s incentive constraint is given by (3) above, whereas the
constraint of the moneylender becomes Q(wE + ¯ LE + wM + ¯ LM)   Q(wE + ¯ LE)   ¯ LM =
f(wM + ¯ LM). While a hike in f reduces the entrepreneur’s bank credit, it also improves the
moneylender’s bargaining position [as Q(wE + ¯ LE) decreases]. This raises his net return and
partly counters the (direct) negative effect of f on ¯ LM. The overall change in ¯ LM depends on
which effect is larger. A boost in wE increases ¯ LE and reduces the moneylender’s proﬁtability,
inducing a lower ¯ LM. As wM is absent from the entrepreneur’s constraint, it has no impact on
¯ LE. If informal credit is competitive (a = 1), the only change is that ¯ LM is independent of
wE.29 In sum, for informal ﬁnance to have a positive incentive effect, some of the project’s
surplus has to be shared with the entrepreneur.
Because of the assumption of one entrepreneur and one moneylender, the informal sector
plays an unrealistically passive role. One plausible distinction between entrepreneurs and mon-
eylenders is the difference in technology endowments. For example, while farmers’ or street
vendors’ production technology applies to managing their farm or selling fruit at the street
stand, traders’ or merchants’ monitoring technology is applicable to more than one farmer or
street vendor. This implies that wealth-constrained traders visit the formal bank sector more
often than a given farmer and, importantly, has less to gain from diverting bank funds. Con-
sider for instance the modiﬁed setting where fM < fE: the opportunity cost of being diligent
is higher for the entrepreneur. Here banks lend relatively more to moneylenders although en-
trepreneurs continue to borrow from the formal institution.30
28 Instead, hikes in wM are fully compensated by decreases in LM, while climbing wE leads to higher ¯ LE (as the
entrepreneur’s incentive constraint becomes less binding) and consequently lower LM.
29 The constraints follow by setting a = 1 in equations (8) and (9). As wE does not enter the moneylender’s
constraint, ¯ LM is independent of wE.
30 Entrepreneurs always have the option of an exclusive bank contract, making it inefﬁcient to exclude them from
bank access. If moneylenders were entrepreneurs’ only source of funds, entrepreneurs earn (at least) the equivalent
of a bank loan but their side payment [of value fE (wE + ¯ LE)] would not be invested. However, if bank credit is
extended to entrepreneurs and moneylenders, the side payment is part of the overall investment.
123.3 Imperfect Bank Competition
Informal lenders’ monitoring ability helps banks to reduce agency cost by allowing them to
channel credit through the informal sector. To show this, formal banks need some market
power. I start by outlining the case without informal lenders and then characterize the outcome
under ﬁnancial sector coexistence.
The bank sets LE and DE by maximizing
DE   LE
subject to the participation constraint
Q(wE + LE)   DE  Q(wE)
and the incentive constraint given by (2). The participation constraint ensures at least the utility
associated with self ﬁnancing the project. DE replaces (1+ r) LE with the borrower choosing
whether or not to accept the bank’s take-it-or-leave-it offer and consequently the amount to
invest. It follows that the relevant incentive and/or participation constraint must bind, otherwise
the bank could increase DE and earn a strictly higher proﬁt.
For low levels of wealth, the incentive constraint binds and the bank’s proﬁt may be written
as Q(wE + LE)   f(wE + LE)   LE. The ﬁrst-order condition of the proﬁt expression deter-
mines the optimal loan size, whereas DE is deﬁned as the solution to the incentive constraint.
Hence, LE is the unique loan size that solves
Q0 (wE + LE)   (1+ f) = 0, (11)
while DE is determined by
Q(wE + LE)   DE = f(wE + LE). (12)
A salient feature of this outcome is that entrepreneurs are provided a constant ﬂoor rent above
their outside option to satisfy the investment level, I = wE + LE, given by equation (11). Since
higher wealth is met by a parallel decrease in credit to maintain the sub-optimal investment,
any wealth improvement is pocketed by the bank. Poor entrepreneurs are thus prevented from
accumulating assets.
As wealth climbs, the participation and the incentive constraint hold simultaneously. A
higher debt capacity permits the bank to increase the repayment obligation such that the en-
trepreneur is indifferent between taking credit and self ﬁnancing the project. Since ﬁrst best is
unattainable, the loan size continues to satisfy the incentive constraint. Hence, the repayment
is determined by the binding participation constraint, while the equilibrium loan size solves
Q(wE) = f(wE + LE). (13)
For rich entrepreneurs only the participation constraint binds and ﬁrst best is obtained.
13Proposition 3 For all f > f
¯




E > 0 such that:
(i) Entrepreneurs with wealth below w
¯
m
E invest I = I0 as given by equation (11), credit (LE)




E) then I 2 [I0, I) is invested
and LE and I increase in wE; if wE  ¯ wm
E then I is invested.
(ii) Market power reduces efﬁciency, that is, ¯ wm
E > wc
E.
Bank market concentration reduces lending and investment. Intuitively, when increasing the
price, the bank lowers the borrower’s incentive to repay. Hence, high interest rates must be
coupled with less lending and consequently lower investment. As a large repayment burden
increases both the bank’s payoff and the entrepreneur’s incentive to default, poor customers
earn rent to avoid diversion of bank credit.
The existence of moneylenders modiﬁes this trade-off. Informal lenders’ monitoring advan-
tage implies that channeled bank capital saves the incentive rent the bank otherwise share with
poor entrepreneurs. Still, forwarded bank money comes at a cost as the bank forgoes part of its
surplus to prevent being cheated by the moneylenders. To illustrate this as simply as possible,
attention is restricted to the range of wealth levels where entrepreneurs receive the bank’s ﬂoor
utility, wE < wm
E.31 Remaining cases are brieﬂy discussed in the ﬁnal section.
Speciﬁcally, if the entrepreneur and the moneylender are poor the bank lends to both.
They receive ﬂoor contracts giving them utility above their outside option of pursuing the en-
trepreneur’s project on their own. The binding incentive constraints and the ﬁrst-order condi-
tion of the bank’s proﬁt expression determine credit extended, LE and LM, and the aggregate
repayment D. More precisely
a[Q(I)   D   wM] + (1  a)wE = f(wE + LE), (14)
(1  a)[Q(I)   D   wE] + awM = f(wM + LM), (15)
and
Q0 (I)   (1+ f) = 0, (16)
with I = wE + LE + wM + LM. The bank charges a price, D = DE + DM, paid in proportion
to the share of the surplus kept by each borrower. Informal ﬁnance permits the bank to decrease
the entrepreneur’s net surplus and to minimize the aggregate loan supporting the sub-optimal
investment. The bank refrains from channeling the entire loan through the informal sector,
however, since the moneylender’s temptation to divert formal credit is too large.
As the informal lender’s debt capacity improves, his participation and incentive constraint
both bind at some point. The increase in moneylender wealth allows the bank to reduce the
poor entrepreneur’s part of the aggregate loan to save on the incentive rent shared with her to
prevent diversion. Speciﬁcally, for the same level of investment [given by equation (16)], LE
31 The threshold wm
E is the wealth level at which the entrepreneurs’ incentive and participation constraint both
bind. It differs from w
¯
m
E, as the investment corresponding to wm
E also depends on the moneylender’s wealth.
14is decreased in step with a climbing wM until the entire loan is extended to the moneylender,
giving rise to credit market segmentation. The moneylender’s repayment obligation DM solves
the binding participation constraint
(1  a)[Q(I)   DM   wE] + awM = (1  a)[Q(wE + wM)   wE] + awM, (17)
while the equilibrium loan size LM satisﬁes
(1  a)[Q(wE + wM)   wE] + awM = f(wM + LM), (18)
with I = wE + wM + LM. The participation constraint ensures the utility associated with the
moneylender self ﬁnancing the project.
A rich enough moneylender is able to support ﬁrst best. Equation (17) determines DM and
I = I. Finally, if the moneylender is sufﬁciently wealthy to self ﬁnance the investment, the
bank and the moneylender compete in the same fashion as described by equation (10) above.
Proposition 4 For all f > f
¯
(wi) and wE < wm
E, entrepreneurs borrow from a bank and













and I if wM 2

¯ wm
M, I   wE

. Entrepreneurs borrow from a bank and a
self-ﬁnanced moneylender and invest I if wM  I   wE.
While informal ﬁnance raises bank-rationed borrowers’ investment, it also limits formal sector
access. As moneylenders become richer, banks are able to reduce the surplus otherwise shared
with poor entrepreneurs. This contrasts with and complements the ﬁndings of Proposition
2 and Corollary 1. In poor societies with weak legal institutions, moneylenders’ monitoring
ability therefore induces two opposing effects. On the one hand, informal ﬁnance complements
banks by allowing more formal capital to reach borrowers directly. On the other hand, informal
lenders substitute for banks by acting as a formal credit channel. The extent to which either
effect dominates depends on the degree of competition in the formal bank sector.
Note that Proposition 4 is independent of informal lenders’ market power. Bank proﬁt de-
creasesastheinformalsectorbecomesmorecompetitive, byreducingmoneylenders’incentive-
compatible bank loan. However, this does not affect the bank’s desire to minimize poor borrow-
ers’ direct involvement. Also, while the analysis assumes that the formal sector is a monopoly,
it is sufﬁcient that the bank has enough market power to make informal lenders’ participation
constraint bind at some point. Then the bank always ﬁnds it more proﬁtable to contract exclu-
sively with the informal sector rather than dealing directly with poor borrowers.
Figure (1) summarizes Propositions 2 and 4 in terms of the moneylender’s debt capacity
(assuming a bank-rationed entrepreneur). The competitive benchmark is depicted above the
line, with the moneylender’s incentive constraint binding below w
¯
c
M. The imperfectly com-




15Figure 1. Moneylender Wealth Thresholds
and together with the participation constraint in-between w
¯
m
M and ¯ wm
M. The participation con-
straint determines the outcome in-between ¯ wm
M and I   wE. (The proofs of Proposition 9 and
Lemmas A5 and A9 establish the relation between the thresholds.32)
3.4 Empirical Evidence
The analysis highlights the interaction between weak institutions, poor agents, and inefﬁcient
markets. As brieﬂy reviewed in the introduction, there is ample evidence showing that better
legal protection alleviates credit rationing, that informal lenders turn to the formal ﬁnancial
sector for additional funds, and that market power is a recurring phenomenon in developing
creditmarkets. Combiningthesefacts, themodelconcludesthatallbutthewealthiestborrowers
turn either to both ﬁnancial sectors simultaneously or to the informal sector exclusively.
The ﬁnding that borrowers’ formal sector debt capacity increases in their wealth is consis-
tent with a series of empirical studies on formal-informal sector interactions in Africa (Graham
et al., 1988; Steel et al., 1997), Asia (Floro and Yotopoulos, 1991; Bell et al., 1997; Banerjee
and Duﬂo, 2007; Gin´ e, 2007), and South America (Key, 1997; Conning, 2001). For example,
in Gin´ e’s study of 2,880 households and 606 small businesses in rural Thailand, the richest
borrowers (measured both by wealth and income) access the formal sector exclusively. As
wealth declines, borrowers resort either to informal lenders (including landlords, professional
moneylenders, traders, and store owners) alone or to both ﬁnancial sectors. A similar pattern
emerges when investigating informal lenders’ formal sector debt capacity. In a survey of 96
wholesalers and retail merchants in Niger, Graham et al. report that the size of retail merchants’
formal sector loan increases in their asset base.
Several case studies illustrate the complementarity between formal and informal ﬁnance.
In particular, local traders and input suppliers, drawing on funds from banks and upstream
buyers, often provide farmers with inputs and credit in the form of cash and in-kind loans on
machinery, seeds, and fertilizers.33 In these instances, informal lenders’ capital base not only
raises investment but also enables borrowers to draw on additional formal ﬁnance. In their ac-








M) increases (decreases) in f. In what follows, I
disregard this possibility.
33 See Reardon and Timmer (2007) for the importance of credit provision in the agricultural output market.
16count of contract farming in North America, Latin America, and Africa, Glover and Kusterer
(1990) write that the informal funding provided by traders and input suppliers “serves to as-
sure banks of the farmer’s credit-worthiness, thus facilitating access to private [bank] credit”
(Glover and Kusterer, 1990, p. 130).34 Related evidence is provided by Campion (2006) in her
study of Peru’s artichoke sector. Campion documents that artichoke processors and input sup-
pliers “provide valuable ﬁnance...to help farmers...to produce high quality artichokes in greater
quantity and improve their returns on investment. Higher returns have lead to greater access to
formal ﬁnance...” (Campion, 2006, p. 10). Wittlinger and Tuesta’s (2006) description of soy-
bean farmers in Paraguay tells a similar story. Farmers sell their produce to and receive credit
from upstream silos that actively oversee the production process. This phase-by-phase supervi-
sion means that the bank ofﬁcers spend less time monitoring the loan, allowing for more formal
capital to be lent directly to the farmers. Moreover, the silos also take bank loans to ﬁnance
fertilizers, fuel, and agricultural equipment provided as in-kind inputs to the farmers.35
The empirical regularity that wealthier informal lenders often are the exclusive clients of
formal banks (rather than poor borrowers) supports the prediction that banks may prefer to
channel their capital through the informal sector. In their study of Philippine agricultural ﬁ-
nance, Floro and Yotopoulos (1991) note that formal lenders and upstream buyers rarely deal
directly with smaller borrowers. Instead, the formal lenders rely on rich farmer-clients as “they
[the rich farmers] have the assets required for leverage” (Floro and Yotopoulos, 1991, p. 46).
Similarly, Rahman (1992) reports that although formal credit totals more than two thirds of
the informal sector’s liabilities in Bangladesh, less than ten percent of the households borrow
directly from the formal sector. Those that take formal credit (and on lend) are “people with suf-
ﬁcient collateral and credibility to borrow from formal sector ﬁnancial institutions” (Rahman,
1992, p. 154). Related support is provided by Harriss (1983) in her study of 400 agricultural
traders and paddy producers in Tamil Nandu, India where large farmers take formal credit to be
on lent to poorer clients. Evidence from Japan’s Meiji era (1868-1912) shows a similar pattern.
During this period, wealthier grain, fertilizer, or textile merchants, landlords, and professional
moneylenders obtained bank credit to ﬁnance poor farmers, weavers, and silk producers other-
wise unable to secure external funding (Teranishi, 2005, 2007).36
In the model, the degree of bank competition affects formal ﬁnancial sector access as well
as the role of informal lenders. This is in line with historical evidence from Plymouth County in
New England, United States (Wang, 2008). Using detailed bank, census, and court records be-
tween 1803 and 1850, Wang documents how increased bank competition allowed poor farmers
and artisans to partially substitute from informal ﬁnance provided by wealthier (bank-ﬁnanced)
merchants, to formal bank credit. Bank records show that merchants, esquires, and gentle-
34 See also Watts (1994) for related support.
35 For a similar account from Croatia, see Mati´ c et al. (2006).
36 See Biggs (1993) for related evidence from early twentieth century Taiwan, where larger ﬁrms on-lent com-
mercial bank credit directly to smaller downstream customers lacking bank access.
17men (the rich) accounted for most of the transactions when the county comprised one bank.37
Meanwhile, the court records of debt claims identify the same wealthy group as providers of
credit to farmers and artisans. After the entry of an additional bank, the proportion of bank
loans to merchants declined from 60 to 25 percent while farmers and artisans increased their
share from 12 to 38 percent. The court records also show that farmers and artisans were less
likely to borrow from wealthy merchants.38 Contemporary data echo these ﬁndings. In Gin´ e’s
(2007) study of formal-informal sector interactions in Thailand, poor borrowers are less likely
to access the informal sector exclusively when bank competition increases. Also, Burgess and
Pande’s (2005) investigation of the effects of bank branch expansion in India (effectively, in-
creased formal sector competition) shows a similar pattern. They ﬁnd that bank borrowing as
a share of total rural household debt increased from 0.3 to 29 percent between 1961 and 1991.
Meanwhile, borrowing from professional moneylenders fell from 61 to 16 percent in the same
period.39, 40
4 Cross-Sectional Predictions
This section studies one of the model’s key premises: that informal ﬁnance emerges in response
to banks’ inability to enforce their legal claims. It also investigates the implications of variation
in income and in bank market structure. As the competitiveness of the informal sector, a, has
an effect on some of my ﬁndings, I initially explore results that are independent of a.
I ﬁrst show that weaker institutions increase the prevalence of informal credit if borrowers
obtain money from both ﬁnancial sectors, while the opposite is true if moneylenders supply all
funds. Speciﬁcally, if entrepreneurs and moneylenders obtain bank credit and moneylenders
are rich enough not to be tempted by diversion, the ratio of informal credit to investment,
B/I = (wM + ¯ LM)/(wE + ¯ LE + wM + ¯ LM), increases in creditor vulnerability f. A hike in
f boosts the proﬁtability of non-prudent behavior relative to investment for poor entrepreneurs,
inducing a shift to agency-free informal ﬁnance (Corollary 1). Consider then the case of credit
market segmentation. If bank-rationed moneylenders are the only providers of entrepreneurial
credit, worse legal protection causes banks to cut the funding of the informal sector to avoid
diversion. That is, the fraction B/I decreases in f. At ﬁrst best, more efﬁcient institutions are
irrelevant for B/I since diversion no longer tempts the moneylender.
My theory further predicts that the ratio B/I increases if borrowers are poor and if mon-
37 Esquires and gentlemen were honorary titles given to people with more wealth and higher social status. Es-
quires could be merchants, large land-owning farmers, attorneys, and judges. Gentlemen were another economi-
cally better-off class, if not quite as wealthy as esquires.
38 That is, the cases where farmers appeared as defendants and merchants as plaintiffs declined after the entry.
39 Note that 30 percent of the households in 1991 still held loans from the government, traders, and landlords.
40 Findings from China also show that informal ﬁnance is more prevalent in the central and the northwest regions
where bank competition is scant and less important in the coastal region where banks are more competitive (Cull
and Xu, 2005; Ayyagari et al., forthcoming; Cheng and Degryse, 2010).
18eylenders are better capitalized. To see this, note that a rise in entrepreneurial wealth induces
a shift from informal to formal ﬁnance and a lower B/I if moneylenders are rich enough to
attain ﬁrst best in the competitive benchmark.41 Higher moneylender wealth does not affect
B/I though, as hikes in wM are compensated by decreases in LM. If the entrepreneur and the
moneylender obtain bank credit under imperfect bank competition, increases in wealth lead to a
decrease in credit to limit diversion. For example, a higher wE reduces the moneylender’s share
of the aggregate loan LM and B/I drops.42 By contrast, if the moneylender is the only bank
borrower, bank credit increases in wM, boosting B relatively more than I as the entrepreneur’s
wealth is unaffected. At ﬁrst best, the outcome is analogous to the competitive case above.
Proposition 5 For bank-rationed entrepreneurs, the ratio of informal credit to investment is:
(i) Increasing in creditor vulnerability (f), decreasing in entrepreneurs’ wealth (wE), and in-




(ii) Nonincreasing in f for wM  w
¯
m
M, decreasing in wE for wM < w
¯
m
M and for wM  ¯ wm
M,
and nondecreasing in wM if banks have market power and wM < I   wE.
A limitation of Proposition 5 is that it does not apply if entrepreneurs and moneylenders are
rationed by competitive banks. This is because variation in f, wE, and wM affects ¯ LE and ¯ LM
simultaneously, with the impact on B/I depending on how the project gains are shared. This is
also true for some of the changes in wE under market segmentation.43 However, by restricting
attention to competitive informal credit (a = 1) and an informal monopoly (a = ˆ a), the model
gives consistent predictions both with respect to institutional quality and with respect to wealth.
Corollary 2 For bank-rationed entrepreneurs, the ratio of informal credit to investment is:
(i) Increasing in creditor vulnerability (f) and decreasing in entrepreneurs’ wealth (wE) for
a = fˆ a,1g and nondecreasing in moneylenders’ wealth (wM) for a = fˆ ag if banks are
competitive.
(ii) Nonincreasing in wE for a = fˆ a,1g if banks have market power and wM < I   wE.
The results presented in Proposition 5 thus continue to hold in this restricted setting. Inter-
estingly, the ﬁrst part of Corollary 2 shows that informal ﬁnance becomes more important as
institutionalqualitydeterioratesevenwheninformallendersarepoor. Thisisbecausethereduc-
tion in entrepreneurs’ bank credit that follows from a higher f dominates the drop in informal
lenders’ bank credit. To see this, consider a monopolistic moneylender under bank competi-
tion. A boost in f reduces ¯ LE, while the effect on ¯ LM is ambiguous due to the moneylender’s
41 That is, ¯ LE (LM) increases (decreases) following a boost in wE (Corollary 1).
42 As investment is locked at the suboptimal level [given by equation (16)], an increase in wE only improves the
entrepreneur’s bargaining position, forcing the bank to lower LM.
43 The effect of f on B/I is ambiguous below w
¯
m
M (when entrepreneurs and moneylenders access the bank under
imperfect bank competition), as a higher f leads to less bank lending and a lower suboptimal investment [given
by (16)]. The total effect depends on which reduction is larger (independently of how project proceeds are split).
19improved bargaining position (Corollary 1). If informal credit is competitive, the decline in ¯ LE
exceeds the fall in ¯ LM, since the entrepreneur keeps the full surplus and subsequently holds a
larger part of the aggregate bank loan. (Wealth results follow in similar fashion from Corollary
1.) Under market segmentation, the moneylender’s loan and the fraction B/I is independent of
entrepreneurial wealth if a = 1, as wE does not enter equation (18). If a = ˆ a, the moneylen-
der’s net return and, consequently, his bank loan and the ratio B/I decrease in wE.
Propositions 2 and 4 indicate that the relative importance of bank-ﬁnanced moneylenders
increases in banks’ market power. To show this formally, I ﬁrst characterize the economy’s
supply of bank credit. As market structure is irrelevant if moneylenders rely on internal funds,
attention is restricted to wealth levels where informal lenders need external capital.
Lemma 1 (i) Entrepreneurs obtain more funds from competitive banks. (ii) There exists a








such that moneylenders with wealth below ˆ wM obtain more
funds from competitive banks and moneylenders with wealth above ˆ wM obtain more funds
under imperfect bank competition.
Since all beneﬁts accrue to the entrepreneurs under competitive banking, competitive banks
supply more credit as a result of improved incentives. Moneylenders take more competitive
bank credit up to ﬁrst best (w
¯
c
M), then reduce their loan in step with rising wealth. Meanwhile,
the imperfectly competitive bank continues to extend additional funds as the efﬁcient outcome
( ¯ wm
M) remains to be attained. [For details, see Figure (1).]
Proposition 6 The ratio of informal credit to investment is higher when banks have market
power and wM 2 ( ˆ wM, I   wE) and indeterminate with respect to bank market structure for
wealth below ˆ wM.
While entrepreneurs obtain more funds from poor moneylenders if banks compete, they also
take additional bank credit (Lemma 1), making the exact prediction imprecise. However, as
moneylenders become wealthier the outcome is clear: informal ﬁnance should be more impor-
tant if it allows banks to save the agency costs.
Using ﬁrm-level data for 26 countries in Eastern Europe and Central Asia, Dabla-Norris and
Koeda (2008) broadly conﬁrm Proposition 5 and Corollary 2. They show that the relationship
between legal institutions and informal credit is indeterminate, while bank lending contracts as
creditor protection worsens. More systematic evidence is offered in a recent study by Chavis et
al. (2009) covering 70,000 small and medium-sized ﬁrms in over 100 countries. As implied by
the model, improvements in creditor protection have a positive effect on access to bank ﬁnance,
particularly for young (and small) ﬁrms.44 Speciﬁcally, the interaction between rule of law
and ﬁrm age is signiﬁcant and negative for bank ﬁnance. Meanwhile, there is no signiﬁcant
44 A drawback of these ﬁndings is their focus on ﬁrm age rather than ﬁrm size/collateral. Other variables, such as
reputation, may have an independent effect on credit access besides collateral. However, to the extent that young
ﬁrms still have lower wealth, the empirical evidence does corroborate the model’s conclusions.
20interactive effect of rule of law for ﬁnance coming from informal sources and trade credit.
My theory explains the insigniﬁcant effect by showing that the relationship can go either way,
while bank credit—if accessible—increases in creditor protection. Dabla-Norris and Koeda
and Chavis et al. also ﬁnd that the use of informal ﬁnance is consistently higher in lower-
income countries. If entrepreneurial wealth is a proxy for income, this is line with the model’s
prediction that informal ﬁnance grows in importance as borrower wealth declines. Finally,
Proposition 6 concurs with the ﬁndings of Burgess and Pande (2005), Gin´ e (2007), and Wang
(2008), that informal ﬁnance is more prevalent as bank markets become less competitive.
5 Welfare, Segmentation, and Financial Development
Why does ﬁnancial sector underdevelopment, in the form of market segmentation, persist? One
reason is that those who potentially inﬂuence the levers of power (for example, wealthy infor-
mal lenders and inﬂuential bankers) gain from status quo. I investigate this issue by considering
how welfare is distributed in the economy.








off when banks have market power. (ii) Entrepreneurs prefer a bank with market power over
the coexistence of a moneylender and a bank with market power.
Informal ﬁnance supports entrepreneurs’ asset growth in the competitive setting. The reason is
twofold. Competition transfers the entire surplus to the bank borrowers, allowing more credit
to be extended. Moneylenders reinforce this effect by further expanding credit provision and by
softening the entrepreneurs’ incentive problem. Competition also adds value to poor moneylen-
ders as they receive more bank funds. By contrast, banks and wealthier moneylenders are better
off if ﬁnancial markets are segmented. This is because the segmented outcome preserves the
market power that moneylenders’ enforcement advantage grants them (a remains unchanged),
whereas they are forced to give up all their rent under competitive banking (a = 1). Part (ii)
of Proposition 7 makes borrowers’ welfare loss explicit. Poor entrepreneurs receive less funds
and consequently lower ﬂoor utility from the monopoly bank (for a given investment) if it also
extends credit to the moneylender. If moneylenders provide all external capital, entrepreneurs
earn the equivalent of doing the project alone with the informal lender, worth strictly less than
the incentive rent provided by the bank.
Besides allowing banks to reduce agency cost, credit market segmentation also softens com-
petition between the formal and the informal ﬁnancial sector, providing an additional rationale
for its persistence. This resonates with the work of Rajan and Zingales (2003) on incumbent
ﬁnancial institutions’ historical support for ﬁnancial repression to maintain status quo. In par-
ticular, suppose rich moneylenders and bankers have more say over local bank market structure
than poor entrepreneurs, for example, through branching restrictions on banking. In this case,
21Proposition 7 provides a political-economy explanation as to why informal ﬁnance and bank
market power are pervasive features of less developed credit markets. In line with my the-
ory, Rajan and Ramcharan (forthcoming) ﬁnd that bank markets in the early twentieth century
United States were more concentrated in counties with wealthy landowners, who often engaged
in lending to local farmers. These landlords frequently had ties with the local bank and the local
store (that offered credit) and were, as the model predicts, against bank deregulation.45 Rajan
and Ramcharan show that there were fewer banks per capita and less formal bank lending to
poor farmers (as well as higher formal interest rates) in counties with a more unequal distribu-
tionoffarmland. Thisisconsistentwiththeskeweddistributionofwealthneededtosupportthe
theory’s predictions. In the model, relatively better-off informal lenders are more creditworthy
compared to poor entrepreneurs.
6 Informal Interest Rates
Aleem (1990), Banerjee (2003), and others have shown that poor borrowers with similar char-
acteristics face informal interest rates ranging from 0 to 200 percent annually in India, Pakistan,
and Thailand.46 In fact, there is large variation in informal lending rates even within the same
sub economy. I now examine factors that may explain some of the observed heterogeneity.
Proposition 8 (i) Bank-rationed moneylenders charge positive rates of interest, R/B 1 > 0.
(ii) R/B   1 is nondecreasing in creditor vulnerability (f) if moneylenders keep the entire
surplus. (iii) R/B 1 is higher when banks have market power and increases as credit markets
become segmented.
First, poormoneylenderschargepositiveratesofinterestregardlessofthedegreeofcompetition
in the adjacent bank market. This is because the price of informal credit reﬂects the incentive
rent moneylenders receive to ensure prudent behavior when forwarding bank funds. Compe-
tition from the bank sector is thus softened as excessive lending to poor entrepreneurs and/or
poor moneylenders would result in diversion. By contrast, a self-ﬁnanced informal sector offers
credit at the opportunity cost of funds.
Second and related to the ﬁrst point, weaker institutions causes interest rates to rise if bank-
rationed moneylenders are monopolists.47 That is, an increase in the opportunity cost of be-
ing diligent, f, transmits into a higher price of informal credit. Speciﬁcally, the interest rate
becomes R/B   1 = [Q(wE + ¯ LE + wM + ¯ LM)   Q(wE + ¯ LE)]/(wM + ¯ LM)   1 when
45 In his study of farm credit in Texas, Haney (1914) writes that the “country merchant act as the banker’s agent
in making crop mortgage loans” (Haney, 1914, p. 54). Haney estimates that as much as 20 percent of all loans in
Texas banks were made to country merchants for the purpose of funding crop mortage securities.
46 For additional evidence, see Udry (1990, 1994) and La Ferrara (2003) for the case of Africa and Das-Gupta et
al. (1989) and Siamwalla et al. (1990) for the case of Asia.
47 As noted in Section 4, general predictions on the effect of creditor vulnerability are difﬁcult to make unless we
restrict attention to either a competitive or a monopolistic informal credit market.
22banks compete. Corollary 1 states that a higher f reduces ¯ LE, while the effect on ¯ LM is am-
biguous. The moneylender’s stronger bargaining position thus enables him to increase the
repayment obligation R; an increase which dominates the ambiguous effect on the loan size
B.48 Under market segmentation, an increase in f limits bank lending to the moneylender but
does not affect wealth, explaining why the reduction in B is larger relative to the drop in R.
At ﬁrst-best investment, institutional changes have no bite.49 Finally, if the cost of diversion
f differs between moneylenders (not only across legal environments), perhaps because they
differ in the number of formal loans outstanding or in the social ties with the formal banker,
this generates additional variation in the interest charged within the same sub economy.
Third, as poor moneylenders extend more credit under competitive banking this leads to
lower interest rates due to diminishing returns to scale. Also, if moneylender wealth climbs,
informal lenders offer credit at the opportunity cost of funds in the competitive setting. Mean-
while, thesegmentedoutcomenotonlypreservesmoneylenders’marketpower, italsoincreases
interest rates further as entrepreneurs lose their outside option when dealing exclusively with
the informal sector.50
Terms offered to the same borrower thus range from an effective price of zero to very high
rates. Accounting for the institutional environment and the possibility of market segmentation
complements the emphasis on monitoring cost as an explanation for the steep lending rates
(see Banerjee, 2003). In my setting, the zero interest result partly depends on the assumption
of zero monitoring cost. However, while allowing for positive monitoring cost on part of the
moneylender adds another layer, it does not qualitatively alter the ﬁndings.
7 Economic Policy
Before I consider possible reforms, let me summarize the main results so far.51 The model’s
basic distortion is the inability of formal banks to enforce their contracts. Better functioning
institutions not only allow banks to lend more to poor borrowers and poor informal lenders, they
can also reduce informal interest rates.52 If the aim is to replace informal with formal ﬁnance,
wealth subsidies may be more effective policy however. While the prevalence of informal
ﬁnance decreases in entrepreneurial wealth, informal credit becomes more important as legal
48 Similar intuition explains the outcome when the entrepreneur and the moneylender both obtain bank ﬁnance
in the imperfectly competitive case.
49 R/B 1 is insensitive to variation in f under ﬁrst best in the competitive benchmark, although entrepreneurs’
credit is affected. This is because competition leads moneylenders to lend at the opportunity cost of funds.
50 In effect, without the bank’s incentive rent entering the bargaining, entrepreneurs are charged the same price
that they would have paid if no bank were present.
51 In what follows, I examine policies that are productivity enhancing, that is, they raise investment. This does
not imply Pareto efﬁciency however; see Bardhan et al. (2000) for a discussion.
52 The interaction between creditor vulnerability and the credit market endogenously determines the threshold of
wealth necessary to attain an efﬁcient investment using only bank funds. Hence, stronger creditor protection also
implies that entrepreneurs with less wealth will succeed in securing an exclusive bank contract.
23protection of banks improves if credit markets are segmented.
Propositions 2 and 4 show that ﬁnancial sector coexistence increases efﬁciency compared
to a pure bank lending regime. The policy recommendations that follow are straightforward
from an efﬁciency perspective, but less clear in terms of borrower welfare. Although regulation
fostering informal sector growth is beneﬁcial for poor borrowers in the competitive benchmark,
the opposite is true under credit market segmentation (Proposition 7). Moreover, while pro-
competitivebankreformsraiseefﬁciency,53 helpborrowersaccesstheformalsector, andreduce
informal interest rates, the caveat may be the lack of political will to introduce such policies, as
discussed in Section 5. Hence, programs that strengthen borrowers’ outside options (similar to
the empowerment strategies of poor tenants documented in Banerjee et al., 2002) offer a way to
diminish the reliance on credit provided by informal lenders and banks. Speciﬁcally, it points
to the importance of alternative sources of credit, such as microﬁnance. In fact, microﬁnance
programs may present a more viable alternative if powerful vested interests (in the form of
wealthy informal lenders and banks) are opposed to bank market reforms.
I now analyze the effects of subsidized credit by allowing for a positive cost of bank capital,
r. Introducing r has three effects: it offers a deposit return that enters the outside option in
the bargaining, it affects the residual return for a given loan size, and it alters the sub-optimal
investment if banks have market power. While a lower r increases investment if the moneylen-
der and the entrepreneur obtain bank credit—regardless of bank market structure—it decreases
lending to the bank-rationed moneylender and subsequent investment under market segmenta-
tion. This is because a drop in r weakens the moneylender’s outside option in his bargaining
with the entrepreneur, while the bank’s price is unaffected [as DM > (1+ r) LM]. The end
effect is a decrease in the prevalence of informal ﬁnance and lower efﬁciency.54
Proposition 9 (i) Financial sector coexistence and bank market competition increase invest-
ment (I). (ii) I decreases in the opportunity cost of capital (r), except if moneylenders are bank
rationed under credit market segmentation, then I increases in r.
Which reform is most efﬁcient? In what follows, I explore the differential impact of changes in
creditor protection, cost of capital, and wealth in terms of gross beneﬁts. Under bank compe-
tition, reduced creditor vulnerability boosts investment more than a lower cost of capital. The
reason is that f inﬂuences the marginal return to the entire investment, whereas r only affects
the return to the bank loan. Speciﬁcally, a drop in f decreases the opportunity cost of being
diligent with bank credit (¯ LE + ¯ LM) and with internal funds (wE + wM), while a reduction
53 In the proof of Proposition 9, I show that ¯ wm
M > ¯ wc
M. That is, a moneylender stops borrowing from competitive
banks before ﬁrst best is attained in the imperfectly competitive case. [See Figure (1).]
54 Exogenously imposed formal interest rate ceilings have a weakly positive effect on efﬁciency. Under compet-
itive banking, the policy never binds. (This assumes that banks are to break even. If the policy implies that banks
should exceed the endogenously determined credit limit, lending will result in diversion.) In the imperfectly com-
petitive case, interest rate ceilings increase bank lending if they bind. Also, if they prohibit banks from charging
an interest rate such that moneylenders’ participation constraint binds, credit market segmentation fails to occur.
24in r increases the residual return for a given loan (¯ LE + ¯ LM). In the imperfectly competitive
scenario, two cases need to be considered. When the entrepreneur and the moneylender borrow
from the bank, changes in creditor vulnerability and cost of capital have an analogous impact
on the sub-optimal investment given by equation (16).55 Under market segmentation, a lower
f increases investment (Proposition 5), while a reduction in r decreases it (Proposition 9).56
Wealth subsidies to borrowers follow the standard prescription in credit-rationing models,
where redistribution in favor of poor entrepreneurs supports increased borrowing and invest-
ment. In my model, informal lenders also face binding credit constraints, suggesting that these
policyimplicationsneedtobemodiﬁed. Considerareformthatredistributesonedollarfromthe
entrepreneur to the moneylender. If rationed entrepreneurs and moneylenders access the bank,
the transfer affects the bargaining weights and subsequent bank lending, but not the project’s
size since every dollar is invested. Under market segmentation, a reallocation in favor of the
bank-rationed moneylender increases investment. As the moneylender’s share of the invest-
ment, not the overall size, determines the incentive-compatible bank loan [equation (18)], an
additional dollar of moneylender wealth draws more bank money into the project.57 A similar
result is obtained in the competitive benchmark if entrepreneurs’ opportunity cost of being dili-
gent exceeds moneylenders’ cost, fM < fE. Although every dollar is invested, moneylenders
attract more bank credit since they are less likely to divert the funds. In sum, while grants to
poor entrepreneurs increase investment and decrease the prevalence of informal ﬁnance, trans-
fers to the informal sector may be a more efﬁcient policy choice.
Proposition 10 Investment (I) increases weakly if: (i) Creditor vulnerability (f) decreases
rather than the opportunity cost of capital (r) and I < I. (ii) Wealth is redistributed from
entrepreneurs to moneylenders.
Redistribution raises investment partly because of moneylenders’ perfect monitoring ability.
If entrepreneurs invest a fraction of the informal loan, the statement remains correct under
credit market segmentation, while the policy lowers efﬁciency in the competitive benchmark.
Inefﬁcient monitoring matters less under segmentation as the transfer’s main effect in this case
comes through a shift in the relative bargaining weights. However, if the diversion return is
higher for the entrepreneurs, fM < fE, the proposition is still valid, given that the informal
monitoring technology is efﬁcient enough and/or the difference fE   fM is sufﬁciently large.
8 Discussion and Concluding Remarks
A worthwhile question is why the bank does not merge with the moneylender, making him the
local branch manager? Speciﬁcally, the bank supplies the ﬁnancial resources and the moneylen-
55 More speciﬁcally, the modiﬁed equation reads Q0 (I)   (1+ f + r) = 0.
56 At ﬁrst best, variation in f has no effect on investment while a reduction in r increases investment by changing
the optimal project size, determined by Q0 (I)   (1+ r) = 0.
57 At ﬁrst-best investment, marginal wealth reallocation no longer matters.
25derthelocalknowledge. Inthecurrentsetting, internalfundsareanecessaryconditionhowever.
Incentive compatibility is violated if banks extend credit to penniless informal lenders/bank em-
ployees. Consider the competitive benchmark and a perfectly competitive informal sector. In
this case, moneylenders’ incentive constraint collapses to R   ¯ LM = ¯ LM   ¯ LM = 0 < f¯ LM.
But it is also true when moneylenders hold all the bargaining power.58 Two important obser-
vations follow. First, it is not sufﬁcient to have a superior enforcement technology to on lend
bank funds. Second, informal lenders are not bank agents; they need to put their own money
at stake to facilitate the intermediation of formal credit. In sum, “bringing the market inside
the ﬁrm” at best replicates the market outcome, as the branch manager has to be incentivized
to act responsibly with the bank funds. However, the merger also adds a new dimension, the
employer-employee relationship, which opens up for opportunistic behavior on the part of the
bank as well.59, 60 Hence, the overall effect is likely to be efﬁciency reducing, conﬁrming why
this kind of organizational design is uncommon in developing credit markets.61
A related concern is whether the key insights would be altered if informal monitoring was
less efﬁcient, if other sharing rules governed the moneylender’s and the entrepreneur’s ex-
change, or if agents engaged in side payments? As regards the ﬁrst objection, suppose the
entrepreneur fails to invest a fraction d 2 (0,1) of the moneylender’s funds.62 It can be shown
that for d sufﬁciently small, equilibrium outcomes remain the same. Pertaining to the choice
of sharing rule, the Nash Bargaining solution produces an efﬁcient outcome similar to Coasian
bargaining since utility is transferable. Any sharing rule therefore yields quantitatively similar
results in terms of the ensuing investment. Finally, side payments do not change the equilib-
rium outcomes since poor entrepreneurs and/or poor moneylenders are unable to compensate
the other party and/or the bank due to their wealth constraints. That is, available funds are
always used most efﬁciently in production.
Allowing for rising entrepreneurial wealth in the imperfectly competitive case changes lit-
tle if the entrepreneur’s wealth climbs and wealth disparity is maintained. Here the bank is
indifferent between dealing with the (relatively) richer moneylender alone and lending a small
amount to the entrepreneur and the remainder to the moneylender. If the entrepreneur is the
58 First, note that the project’s aggregate incentive-compatible bank loan is the same, with or without the penniless
moneylender, as he does not add to investment. Second, when a = ˆ a, the entrepreneur receives her outside option,
equivalentofexclusivebankborrowing, butthisisexactlythevalueoftheentireprojectincludingthemoneylender.
Hence, after compensating the entrepreneur, the moneylender earns zero. When bank competition is imperfect, a
loan to a penniless moneylender satisﬁes incentive compatibility. However, entrepreneurs prefer an exclusive bank
contract as it increases their incentive rent. Since the bank is indifferent between lending to entrepreneurs alone or
both (aggregate rent and loan size remain the same) and entrepreneurs are the project’s proprietors, moneylenders
get shut out.
59 Similar in spirit to Williamson’s (1985) arguments of why “selective interventions” are hard to implement.
60 Moreover, if there is output uncertainty and monitoring cost is positive, bank managers may be tempted to
reduce monitoring and subsequent monitoring cost only to claim that entrepreneurial failure was due to exogenous
events. (Allowing for output uncertainty would not change the theory’s main predictions.)
61 See Varghese (2004) for a survey of the issue.
62 The value d could be a deadweight loss or, alternatively, a beneﬁt accruing directly to the entrepreneur.
26richer party, the outcome resembles the one analyzed in detail above, now with the bank gradu-
ally reducing its loan to the poor moneylender. If entrepreneurs and moneylenders are equally
afﬂuent though short of ﬁrst best, both receive credit. Finally, similar to bank competition, rich
entrepreneurs only take bank credit. Thus what matters for the results is that informal lenders
hold relatively more assets compared to entrepreneurs.
As the model stands, informal lenders’ occupational choice is restricted to lending. The
setup has allowed me to analyze how the basic traits uniting informal lenders: local enforce-
ment and some wealth, shape less developed credit markets. In a more general setting, ad-
ditional sources of income (and/or collateral) make it less tempting to behave non diligently,
enabling the bank to extend more funds or save on incentive-related costs. Extending the the-
ory by admitting complementary sources of income would permit for a characterization of how
informal lenders’ enforcement technology and debt capacity vary across occupation and how
monitoring ability and wealth interact in attracting outside funding. For example, are input
suppliers better suited to extend credit to poor farmers and draw on external capital, as com-
pared to landlords, merchants, shopkeepers, and upstream buyers? It would also be interesting
to explore the question of who becomes a moneylender. Such a model has the potential to
explain, among other things, how the informal sector’s market power is determined. If enforce-
ment rests on social sanctions available within a community but all members are equally poor,
anyone can become a moneylender, as well as attract outside funding. By contrast, if one vil-
lager is slightly wealthier than the rest, she will attract all outside funding and become the local
monopolist. Another topic for future research would be to develop a more explicit political-
economy model to understand the interaction between the credit market and the formation of
interest groups.
In closing, the theory laid out in this paper lends itself to empirical testing. While the key
ﬁndings stand up well to the available evidence, more quantitative work is needed to thoroughly
understand how the informal sector’s resource constraints affect its ability to ﬁnance poor bor-
rowers as well as attract outside funding. Combining systematic data on informal lenders’ debt
capacity with measures of institutional quality and market structure would also allow for fur-
ther tests of the model’s predictions. Detailed micro evidence that sheds light on the role played
by informal ﬁnance would be an important complement to the growing experimental literature
investigating credit markets in developing countries.
27Appendix
The following result will be helpful in the subsequent analysis.
Lemma A2 Q0 (wE + ¯ LE)   (1+ f) < 0.
Proof. When the entrepreneur (henceforth E) borrows from a competitive bank (henceforth
B) and the credit limit binds,
Q(wE + ¯ LE)   ¯ LE   f(wE + ¯ LE) = 0. (A1)
This constraint is only binding if Q0 (wE + ¯ LE)   (1+ f) < 0. Otherwise, ¯ LE could be
increased without violating the constraint.
Proof of Proposition 1
Proposition 1 is proved in the main text, except for the comparative static results and the exis-
tence and the uniqueness of wc
E.
Lemma A3 There exists a unique threshold wc
E (f) > 0 such that Q(wE + ¯ LE)   ¯ LE  
f(wE + ¯ LE) = 0 for wE = wc
E (f) and wE + ¯ LE = I.
Proof. The threshold wc
E is the smallest wealth level that satisﬁes wE + ¯ LE = I. As (A1)
yields the maximum incentive-compatible investment level, wc
E satisﬁes
Q(I)   I (1+ f) + wc
E = 0. (A2)





f   Q0 (wE + ¯ LE)
Q0 (wE + ¯ LE)   (1+ f)
> 0,
where the inequality follows from Lemma A2, Q0 (I)  1, and f < 1. Finally, wc
E > 0 is a
result of the assumption that f > f
¯
[equation (1)].
Lemma A4 If wE  wc
E then LE and I increase in wE and decrease in f.
Proof. The proof that d¯ LE/dwE > 0 is provided in Lemma A3. As (A1) also determines





wE + ¯ LE
Q0 (wE + ¯ LE)   (1+ f)
< 0,
where the inequality follows from Lemma A2. As (A1) also determines the investment level,
dI/df < 0 follows.
Proof of Proposition 2




M, and ¯ wc
M and proceed with the equilibrium
outcomes.
28Lemma A5 There exist unique thresholds wc
E(f) > 0, w
¯
c
M(f), and ¯ wc
M(f) such that:
(i) Q(wE + ¯ LE)   ¯ LE   f(wE + ¯ LE) = 0 for wE = wc
E (f) and wE + ¯ LE = I;
(ii) a[Q(wE + ¯ LE + wM + ¯ LM)   ¯ LE   ¯ LM   wM] + (1  a)wE   f(wE + ¯ LE) = 0 and




M (f) and wE + ¯ LE + wM + ¯ LM = I;
(iii) Q(wE + ¯ LE + wM)  ¯ LE  wM  f(wE + ¯ LE) = 0 for wM = ¯ wc
M (f) and wE + ¯ LE +






Proof. Part (i): The proof is provided in Lemma A3.
Part (ii): The threshold w
¯
c
M is the smallest wealth level that satisﬁes wE + ¯ LE + wM +
¯ LM = I when E and the moneylender (henceforth M) utilize bank funds as given by (8)
and (9) in the main text. Using (8) and (9) to solve for the maximum incentive-compatible




Q(I)   I (1+ f) + wE + w
¯
c
M = 0. (A3)
The threshold is unique if both ¯ LE and ¯ LM are increasing in wM. Differentiating (8) and (9)




a[Q0 (I)   1]






f[Q0 (I)   f]   a[Q0 (I)   1]
f[1+ f   Q0 (I)]
> 0,
where the inequalities follow from Lemma A2, Q0 (I)  1, and f < 1.
Part (iii): The threshold ¯ wc
M is the smallest wealth level that satisﬁes wE + ¯ LE + wM = I
at which M is able to self ﬁnance E. Thus, for a given level of E’s wealth, wE, ¯ wc
M satisﬁes
Q(I)   I (1+ f) + wE + ¯ wc
Mf = 0. (A4)
The threshold is unique if ¯ LE (LM) is independent of (decreasing in) wM when the relevant
constraints are given by (10) in the main text and the ﬁrst-order condition Q0 (I)  1 = 0. Dif-









Part (iv): Combining (A3) and (A4), yields w
¯
c
M = f ¯ wc





f < 1. Finally, w
¯
c
M > 0 is a result of the assumption that f > f
¯
(wE) [equation (4)].
29Lemma A6 If (i) wE < wc
E and wM < ¯ wc
M then the entrepreneur borrows from a bank and
a bank-ﬁnanced moneylender. If (ii) wE < wc
E and wM  ¯ wc
M then the entrepreneur borrows
from a bank and a self-ﬁnanced moneylender. If (iii) wE  wc
E then the entrepreneur borrows
exclusively from a bank.
Proof. I consider E’s and M’s incentive constraints given that B breaks even. Five distinct
cases need to be analyzed as E may borrow from: (i) B exclusively; (ii) B and a bank-ﬁnanced
M; (iii) a bank-ﬁnanced M exclusively; (iv) a self-ﬁnanced M exclusively; (v) B and a self-
ﬁnanced M.
Part (i): First, consider wM < w
¯
c
M. Recognizing the concavity of Q(I) and Q0 (I)  1, it
follows that E and M prefer Case (ii) to Cases (iii)-(v) for any a. Finally, for a > ˆ a as deﬁned in








, wE + wM
accounts for the interval of credit lines such that wM < I  wE   LE, for a given wE and wM.
From the main text we have that Case (ii) leaves E with the full surplus, while M is indifferent









Part (ii): Here, wE + wM accounts for the interval of credit lines such that wM  I  
wE   LE, for a given wE and wM. The only difference from Part (ii) is that M refrains from
bank borrowing when he is able to self ﬁnance large parts of the ﬁrst-best investment, making
Case (ii) irrelevant. Thus, Case (v) is the only possible outcome since in Cases (iii) and (iv), E
would have to share part of a (possibly smaller) surplus with M.
Part (iii): As E turns to B ﬁrst and is able to satisfy ﬁrst best, Case (i) is the outcome.
Proof of Corollary 1 (Comparative Statics)
Proof. For wM < w
¯
c
M and wE < wc
E: Differentiating (8) and (9) in the main text with




f[Q0 (I)   f]   (1  a)[Q0 (I)   1]





(1  a)[Q0 (I)   1]





(wE + ¯ LE)f(1  a)[Q0 (I)   1]   fg   (wM + ¯ LM)a[Q0 (I)   1]






(wM + ¯ LM)fa[Q0 (I)   1]   fg   (wE + ¯ LE)(1  a)[Q0 (I)   1]
f[1+ f   Q0 (I)]
< 0,
where the inequalities follow from Lemma A2, Q0 (I)  1, and f < 1. The proof that
d¯ LE/dwM  0 and d¯ LM/dwM > 0 is provided in Lemma A5. If a = ˆ a, the relevant
constraints are given by (3) in the main text and by
Q(wE + ¯ LE + wM + ¯ LM)   Q(wE + ¯ LE)   ¯ LM = f(wM + ¯ LM). (A5)





f   Q0 (wE + ¯ LE)





Q0 (I)   Q0 (wE + ¯ LE)








f   Q0 (I)





wE + ¯ LE






(wM + ¯ LM)[Q0 (wE + ¯ LE)   (1+ f)]   (wE + ¯ LE)[Q0 (I)   Q0 (wE + ¯ LE)]
[Q0 (wE + ¯ LE)   (1+ f)][Q0 (I)   (1+ f)]
70,









, wE < wc
E, and all a: The relevant constraints are given by (10)
in the main text and the ﬁrst-order condition Q0 (I)   1 = 0. Differentiating (10) and the























wE + ¯ LE
f
> 0,
wheretheﬁrstinequalityfollowsfrom f < 1. Theproofthat d¯ LE/dwM = 0and dLM/dwM <
0 is provided in Lemma A5.
Proof of Proposition 3
Proposition 3 is proved in the main text, except for the comparative static results and the exis-
tence and the uniqueness of w
¯
m
E and ¯ wm
E.
Lemma A7 There exist unique thresholds w
¯
m
E(f) and ¯ wm
E(f) such that:
(i) f(wE + LE)   Q(wE) = 0 for wE = w
¯
m
E (f) and wE + LE = I, with the investment level
given by equation (11) in the main text;
31(ii) f(wE + LE)   Q(wE) = 0 for wE = ¯ wm





E(f) > 0 and ¯ wm
E(f) > wc
E (f).
Proof. Part (i): The threshold w
¯
m
E is the smallest wealth level at which E’s incentive con-
straint equals her participation constraint allowing E to invest wE + LE = I, with I given by







E) = 0. (A6)
The threshold is unique if LE is decreasing in wE when the equilibrium is given by (11) and








E > 0 follows from the assumption that f > f
¯
.
Part (ii): The proof is analogous to the proof of Part (ii) and omitted.
Part (iii): Solving for w
¯
m
E and ¯ wm











E and ¯ wm
E and combining the two expressions, yields Q(I)   I = Q( ¯ wm
E)  
wc
E, where ¯ wm
E > wc
E follows from concavity.
Lemma A8 If wE  w
¯
m





E) then LE and I increase in wE.
Proof. When wE  w
¯
m
E, the proof that dLE/dwE < 0 is provided in Lemma A7. Differen-
tiating (11) and (12) in the main text and the investment condition, wE + LE = I, with respect








E), the relevant constraints are given by (13) in the main text, the binding
participation constraint, Q(wE + LE)   DE = Q(wE), and the investment condition, wE +
LE = I. Differentiating (13), the binding participation constraint, and the investment condition














where the ﬁrst inequality follows from Q0 (I)  1 and f < 1.
Proof of Proposition 4




M, and ¯ wm
M and proceed with the equilibrium
outcomes.
32Lemma A9 There exist unique thresholds wm
E (f) > 0, w
¯
m
M (f), and ¯ wm
M (f) such that:
(i) f(wE + LE)   aQ(wE + B)   (1  a)wE + aB = 0 for wE = wm
E (f) and wE + LE +
B = I, with the investment level given by equation (16) in the main text;
(ii) f(wM + LM) (1 a)[Q(wE + wM)   wE] awM = 0 for wM = w
¯
m
M (f) and wE +
wM + LM = I, with the investment level given by equation (16) in the main text;
(iii) f(wM + LM)   (1   a)[Q(wE + wM)   wE]   awM = 0 for wM = ¯ wm
M (f) and






Proof. Part (i): The threshold wm
E is the smallest wealth level at which E’s incentive con-
straint equals her participation constraint allowing E to invest wE + LE + B = I, with I given
by (16) in the main text. Thus, for a given level of M’s wealth, wM, wm
E satisﬁes
f(I   B)   aQ(wm
E + wM)   (1  a)wm
E + awM = 0. (A7)
Thethresholdisuniqueif LE+LM decreasein wE whentheequilibriumisgivenby(14)to(16)
in the main text. fThe same reasoning applies when wM 2 [w
¯
m
M, I   wE).g Differentiating













with dLE/dwE + dLM/dwE =  1. To show wm
E > 0, let a = ˆ a in (A7). This yields
f(I   B)   Q(wm
E) = 0, where wm
E > 0 follows from the assumption that f > f
¯
. Then
let a = 1. Here, f(I   B)   Q(wm
E + wM) + wM = 0. Note that wm
E decreases in wM for
wM < I   wE. As wM approaches I wE, I have that f(I wM) Q(I)+I wm
E=0,
which is identical to (A4). If wm
E=0 then wM=I, but this contradicts ¯ wc
M<I. Hence, wm
E>0.
Part (ii): The threshold w
¯
m
M is the smallest wealth level at which M’s incentive constraint
equals his participation constraint allowing an investment of wE +wM + LM = I, with I given




f(I   wE)   (1  a)[Q(wE + w
¯
m
M)   wE]   aw
¯
m
M = 0. (A8)
The threshold is unique if LE + LM decrease in wM when the equilibrium is given by (14)
to (16) in the main text. Differentiating (14) to (16) with respect to LE, LM, and wM using













33with dLE/dwM + dLM/dwM =  1.
Part (iii): The threshold ¯ wm
M is the smallest wealth level at which M’s incentive constraint
equals his participation constraint allowing an investment of wE + wM + LM = I. Thus, for
a given level of E’s wealth, wE, ¯ wm
M satisﬁes
f(I   wE)   (1  a)[Q(wE + ¯ wm
M)   wE]   a ¯ wm
M = 0. (A9)
The threshold is unique if LM is increasing in wM when the equilibrium is given by (17) and





(1  a) Q0 (wE + wM) + a   f
f
> 0,
where the inequality follows from Q0 (I)  1 and f < 1.
Part (iv): Combining (A8) and (A9), yields (I0   wE)f(1  a)[Q(wE + ¯ wm
M)   wE] +
a ¯ wm
Mg = (I   wE)f(1  a)[Q(wE + w
¯
m
M)   wE] + aw
¯
m
Mg, with I0 given by (16) in the







M>0 follows from the assumption that f>f
¯
.
Lemma A10 If (i) wE < wm
E and wM < w
¯
m
M then the entrepreneur borrows from a bank and a
bank-ﬁnanced moneylender. If (ii) wE < wm





M, I   wE

then the entrepreneur
borrows exclusively from a bank-ﬁnanced moneylender. If (iii) wE < wm
E and wM  I   wE
then the entrepreneur borrows from a bank and a self-ﬁnanced moneylender.
Proof. I consider B’s utility given that the relevant (incentive or participation) constraint of
E and M is satisﬁed.
Part (i): There are two distinct cases to consider when wE < wm




if the incentive constraints of E and M bind, B prefers lending to both rather than only one of
them as this minimizes the aggregate loan size needed to satisfy I0 [given by (16) in the main
text]. When M’s participation and incentive constraint hold simultaneously, B can either: (i)
scale up the loan to E and M, allowing the investment to rise above I0; or (ii) maintain I = I0
by reallocating the loan from E to M in response to an increase in M’s wealth. Suppose Case
(i) is a candidate equilibrium, as deﬁned by (14) to (16) in the main text. An increase in wM
allows B to increase LM to the point at which M’s incentive constraint equals his participation
constraint. M’s additional loan raises E’s investment return and permits a larger loan to E as
well. Hence, an increase in M’s wealth increases B’s utility by (differentiating UB = Q(I)  




Q0(wE + wM)[Q0 (I)   (1+ f)] + f
f
,
where Q0 (I) < 1 + f as I > I0. Meanwhile, Case (ii) implies that an increase in wM is met
by an increase in LM and a subsequent decrease in LE satisfying dLM/dwM + dwM/dwM =




Q0(wE + wM)[Q0 (I)   (1+ f)] + f
f
.
34Hence, when wE < wm
E and wM < w
¯
m
M, E borrows from B and a bank-ﬁnanced M with
wE + LE + wM + LM = I0.
Part (ii): When wE < wm





M, I   wE

the only difference from Part (i) is
that M’s debt capacity has improved, allowing B to extend the entire loan to M as this saves the
incentive rent otherwise shared with E.
Part (iii): When wE < wm
E and wM  I   wE, M is able to self ﬁnance ﬁrst-best invest-
ment and the same outcome as described in Part (ii), Lemma A6 is obtained.
Proof of Proposition 5
Proof. Differentiating the ratio of informal credit to investment, B/I, with respect to f, wE,
and wM yields rf=[(dLM/df)I   (dI/df)B]/I2, rwE=[(dLM/dwE)I   (dI/dwE)B]/I2,
and rwM = f[d(wM + LM)/dwM]I   (dI/dwM)Bg/I2, respectively. Investment is unaf-
fected by variation in f, wE, and wM (wE and wM) at ﬁrst best (when it is given by (16) in the
main text).





and rwM= (1+dLM/dwM)/I=0, using the comparative statics established in Corollary 1.
Part (ii): First, I derive the relevant comparative statics. When wE < wm







, the constraints are given by (17) and (18) in the main text. Differentiating (17)
and (18) with respect to LM, I, and f using Cramer’s rule I obtain dLM/df = dI/df =
 B/f < 0. When wE < wm
E and wM 2

¯ wm
M, I   wE

, the constraints are given by (17) in
the main text and the ﬁrst-order condition Q0 (I)   1 = 0. Differentiating (17) and the ﬁrst-
order condition with respect to LM, wE, and wM using Cramer’s rule I obtain dLM/dwE =
dLM/dwM =  1. Next, I determine the ratios. When wE < wm




rwE = (dLM/dwE)/I < 0 and rwM = (1+ dLM/dwM)/I > 0, using the comparative stat-
ics established in Lemma A9. If wE < wm








, then rf =  BwE/fI2 < 0
and rwM = [(1  a) Q0 (wE + wM) + a]wE/fI2 > 0, using the comparative statics estab-
lished above and in Lemma A9. If wE < wm
E and wM 2

¯ wm
M, I   wE

, then rf = rwM = 0
and rwE =  1/I < 0, using the comparative statics established above.
Proof of Corollary 2
Proof. Part (i): When wE < wc
E, wM < w
¯
c
M, and a = ˆ a the relevant constraints are
given by (3) in the main text and (A5). Differentiating (3) and (A5) with respect to I, wE, wM,
and f using Cramer’s rule I obtain dI/dwE = dI/dwM = [1 + f   Q0 (wE + ¯ LE)]/Y and
dI/df = I [Q0 (wE + ¯ LE)   (1+ f)]/Y, with Y = [Q0 (wE + ¯ LE)   (1+ f)] 
[Q0 (I)   (1+ f)] > 0, where the inequality follows from Lemma A2, Q0 (I)  1, and f < 1.
Using Corollary 1 and the derived comparative statics, I have that rf = f[B(Q0(wE + ¯ LE)  
(1 + f))   (wE + ¯ LE)(Q0(I)   Q0(wE + ¯ LE))]I   BQ0(wE + ¯ LE)   (1 + f))Ig/YI2 =
(wE + ¯ LE)[Q0 (wE + ¯ LE)   Q0 (I)]/YI > 0, rwE = f[Q0 (I)   Q0 (wE + ¯ LE)]I  
[1 + f   Q0 (wE + ¯ LE)]Bg/YI2 < 0, and rwM = f[(Q0 (wE + ¯ LE)   (1+ f))(f   Q0 (I))
+ ((Q0 (wE + ¯ LE)   (1+ f))(Q0 (I)   (1+ f))]I   [1 + f   Q0 (wE + ¯ LE)]Bg/YI2 =
(wE + ¯ LE)[1 + f   Q0 (wE + ¯ LE)]/YI2 > 0, where the inequalities follow from Lemma
A2 and concavity. If a = 1, the relevant constraints are given by (8) and (9) in the main
text. Differentiating (8) and (9) with respect to I, wE, and f using Cramer’s rule I obtain
35dI/df =  fI/Q and dI/dwE = f/Q, with Q = f[1 + f   Q0 (I))] > 0, where the
inequality follows from Lemma A2. Using Corollary 1 and the derived comparative statics,
I have that rf = f[B(Q0 (I)   (1+ f))]I + BfIg/QI2 = B[Q0 (I)   1]/QI > 0 and
rwE =  fB/QI2 < 0, where the inequalities follow from Q0 (I)  1. When wE < wc
E
and wM  w
¯
c
M, the results are found in the proof of Proposition 5, Part (i).









, and a = ˆ a the relevant constraints are given
by (17) in the main text and by
Q(wE + wM)   Q(wE) = f(wM + LM). (A10)
Differentiating (17) and (A10) with respect to I, LM, and wE using Cramer’s rule I obtain
dI/dwE = [f + Q0 (wE + wM)   Q0 (wE)]/f and dLM/dwE = [Q0 (wE + wM)  
Q0 (wE)]/f. Using the derived comparative statics, I have that rwE = f[Q0 (wE + wM)  
Q0 (wE)]I   [f + Q0 (wE + wM)   Q0 (wE)]Bg/( f)I2=f[Q0 (wE + wM)   Q0 (wE)]wE
  fBg/fI2 < 0, where the inequality follows from concavity. If a = 1, the relevant con-
straints are given by (17) and (18) in the main text. Differentiating (8) and (9) with respect
to I, LM, and wE using Cramer’s rule I obtain dI/dwE = 1 and dLM/dwE = 0. Using the
derived comparative statics I have that rwE =  B < 0. When wE < wm




wM  ¯ wm
M, the results are found in the proof of Proposition 5, Part (ii).
Proof of Lemma 1
[As above, the competitive (monopoly) outcome is denoted by superscript c (m).]
Proof. Part (i): There are two distinct cases to consider. First, when wM < w
¯
m
M, Ic > Im
follows from Lemma A2, (16) in the main text, and concavity. Combining (8) and (9) and
(14) and (15) in the main text, yields Q(Ic)   Ic = fIc and Q(Im)   D = fIm, respec-
tively. Subtracting Lm
E from Lc
E using E’s incentive constraints given by (8) and (14) yields










, monopoly bank lending to E ceases, hence Lc
E > Lm
E = 0.
Part (ii): I begin by showing the existence and the uniqueness of ˆ wM. From Lemma A5,
dLc


















. By continuity and Proposition 9, there exists a unique threshold










M. Having established the existence




proof is analogous to the proof of Part (i) resulting in Lc
M > Lm














M, which contradicts Proposition 9 and so
Lc
M > Lm
M. Third, when wM 2

ˆ wM, ¯ wc
M







M, I   wE

, competitive bank lending to M ceases, hence Lm
M > Lc
M = 0.
Proof of Proposition 6
Proof. When wM 2 ( ˆ wM, I wE), Bm/Im Bc/Ic = (BmIc BcIm)/ImIc > 0, since
Bm > Bc from Lemma 1 and Ic  Im. When wM < ˆ wM, Bm/Im   Bc/Ic is indeterminate,
as Bm < Bc from Lemma 1, while Ic > Im.
Proof of Proposition 7
(Let Ui
E and Ui
M denote E’s and M’s respective utility.)
36Proof. Part (i): First, from Lemma 1 I have that Lc
E > Lm






E) > f(wE + Lm
E) = Um





M, I   wE

, Uc
E = f(wE + Lc
E) >
f(wE + Lm
E) > aQ(wE + wM) + (1  a)wE   awM = Um





















M, I   wE

, Uc
M = wM <
(1  a)(Q(wE + wM)   wE) + awM = Um
M.
Part (ii): Denote isolation by Umi
E and coexistence by Umc




E = fI0 >
f(I0   wM   LM) = Umc









E = fI0 > f(I0   wM   LM) > aQ(wE + wM) + (1  a)wE   awM = Umc
E .
Proof of Proposition 8
Proof. Part (i): It sufﬁces to show that Rc/Bc   1 > 0 for wM < w
¯
c
M, as Rm/Bm >
Rc/Bc (established in Part (iii) below). Hence, from (9) in the main text, I have that Rc/Bc  
1 = [f(wM + Lc
M)   wM]/(wM + Lc




Part (ii): Differentiating the informal interest rate, R/B 1, with respect to f yields i=





a=ˆ a, the relevant constraints are given by (3) in the main text and (A5). Differentiating (3) and
(A5) with respect to I and f using Cramer’s rule I obtain dI/df=I[Q
0(wE+¯ LE) (1+f)]/W,
with W = [Q0 (wE + ¯ LE)   (1+ f)][Q0 (I)   (1+ f)] > 0, where the inequality follows
from Lemma A2. Using Corollary 1 and the derived comparative static, I have that i =
fB[IQ0 (I)(Q0 (wE + ¯ LE)   (1+ f))   (wE + ¯ LE)Q0 (wE + ¯ LE)(Q0(I)   (1 + f))]  
R[B(Q
0(wE+¯ LE) (1+ f)) (wE+¯ LE)(Q
0(wE+¯ LE) Q
0(I)]g/WB
2. Note that Rja=ˆ a =
Q(wE+¯ LE+B) Q(wE+¯ LE). Applying the mean-value theorem yields R = BQ0(x), where
Q0(x)2(Q
0(I),Q0(wE+¯ LE)). Inserting into i and simplifying, I have that i= fB[Q0(wE+¯ LE)
 (1+ f)][Q0 (I)  Q0 (x)]+(wE + ¯ LE)[Q0 (wE + ¯ LE)  Q0 (I)][1+f  Q0 (x)]g/WB >
0, where the inequality follows from Lemma A2 and concavity. At ﬁrst best, variation in f no
longer affects R/B   1. In the monopoly case, when wE < wm
E, wM < w
¯
m
M, and a = ˆ a, the
relevant constraints are given by
Q(wE + bL)   DE = f(wE + bL), (A11)
Q(I)   Q(wE + bL)   DM = f(wM + (1  b) L), (A12)
and
Q0 (I)   (1+ f) = 0, (A13)
with I = wE +wM + L, where LE = bL, LM = (1  b) L, and b 2 (0,1). Differentiating (3)
and(A5)withrespectto I, L, and f usingCramer’sruleIobtain dI/df = dL/df = 1/Q
00
(I).
Using the derived comparative statics and noting that R = Q(I)   Q(wE + bL), I have that
i = fB[Q0 (I)   bQ0 (wE + bL)]   (1   b)[Q(I)   Q(wE + bL)]g/Q
00
(I) B2. Applying
the mean-value theorem and simplifying, I have that i = [Q0 (I)   bQ0 (wE + bL)   (1  
b)Q0 (J)]/Q
00
(I) B > 0, with Q0 (J) 2 (Q0 (I),Q0 (wE + bL)), where the inequality fol-









, and a = ˆ a the relevant constraints
are given by (17) in the main text and by (A10). Differentiating (17) and (A10) with respect
to I, LM, and f using Cramer’s rule I obtain dI/df = dLM/df =  (wM + LM)/f. Us-
ing the derived comparative static and noting that R = Q(I)   Q(wE), I have that i =
37fBQ0 (I) [Q(I)  Q(wE)]g/( f)B. Applying the mean-value theorem and simplifying, I
have that i = [Q0 (d) Q0 (I)]/f > 0, with Q0 (d) 2 (Q0 (I),Q0 (wE)), where the inequality
follows from concavity. At ﬁrst best, variation in f no longer affects R/B   1.
Part (iii): I ﬁrst demonstrate that Rm/Bm > Rc/Bc and then show that Rm/Bm increases
under credit market segmentation. First, when wM < w
¯
m
M, let a = 1. This gives Rm/Bm  
Rc/Bc=(RmBc   RcBm)/BmBc=
 









Then let a=ˆ a. This gives fBc[Q(Im) Q(wE+Lm
E)] Bm[Q(Ic) Q(wE+Lc
E)]g/BmBc.
Applying the mean-value theorem yields BmBc[Q0 (#)   Q0 (d)]/BmBc, where Q0 (#) 2
(Q0 (Im),Q0 (wE + Lm
E)) and Q0 (d) 2 (Q0 (Ic),Q0 (wE + Lc
E)). From Lemma A2 and (16)
in the main text, I have that Q0 (Im) > Q0 (wE + Lc











and proceeding in analogous fashion by taking limits, I have again





M, I   wE

, Rc/Bc = 1 and the claim
follows trivially.
I now determine how Rm/Bm changes as result of segmentation. To do this, I evaluate
Rm/Bm at wM = w
¯
m
M and compare with ˆ Rm/ ˆ Bm at wM = w
¯
m








 g, where #, d, and g are small, strictly positive, and satisfy d=#+g, as investment
is constant. First, let a=1. This gives Rm/Bm  ˆ Rm/ ˆ Bm=fBm [fI + #   Q(wE+wM)] +
DE   d[Q(I)   Q(wE+wM) + wM]g/Bm ˆ Bm, with fI = f(wE + d) + f(wM + LM) =
f(wE + d) + wM > Q(wE + wM)   wM + wM = Q(wE + wM), where the inequality
follows from wE < wm
E. Hence, for d sufﬁciently small, Rm/Bm > ˆ Rm/ ˆ Bm. Next, let a = ˆ a.
This gives fBm [Q(I)   Q(wE + d)] d[Q(I)   Q(wE)]g/Bm ˆ Bm. Again, for d sufﬁciently
small, Rm/Bm > ˆ Rm/ ˆ Bm.
Proof of Proposition 9
Proof. Part (i): I start with ﬁnancial sector coexistence. Under competitive banking, the
relevant constraints are given by (A2) and (A3). Denote the critical wE that satisﬁes (A3) by
ˆ wc
E. Comparison yields wc
E > ˆ wc
E > 0, where the last inequality follows from the assumption
that f > f
¯
(wM). Under monopoly banking, two investment levels I0 [given by (16) in the





E + B) + (1  a)wm
E   aB + fB. As the critical threshold wm
E decreases




E. The proof when I = I is analogous and
omitted. Next, I turn to bank market power. First, note that ¯ wm
M as deﬁned by (A9) decreases
in wE. In particular, allow wE to increase up to the point at which f(wE + LE)   aQ(wE +
wM)   (1  a)wE + awM = 0 for wE + LE + wM = I, or f(I   wM)   aQ(wE +
wM) (1  a)wE + awM = 0. Denote the critical wM that satisﬁes this last equality by ˜ wm
M.
From the previous argument it follows that ˜ wm
M < ¯ wm
M. Hence, to show that ¯ wc
M < ¯ wm
M, it
sufﬁces to verify that ¯ wc
M < ˜ wm
M. Then, observe that ˜ wm
M decreases in a. Hence, combining the
expression for ˜ wm
M as deﬁned above with the expression for ¯ wc
M as given by (A4) and allowing
a = 1, yields I[Q(I)   I   Q(wE + ˜ wm
M) + wE + ˜ wm
M] + ¯ wc
M

Q(wE + ˜ wm





M[Q(I)   I + wE] = 0. Let [Q(I)   I   Q(wE + ˜ wm
M) + wE + ˜ wm
M]  F, where
F > 0 by concavity and Q0 (I)  1. Suppose ﬁrst that ˜ wm
M = ¯ wc
M. This implies that  
I   ˜ wm
M

F = 0. But this equality contradicts I > ˜ wm
M and F > 0. Suppose then that
38˜ wm
M = ¯ wc
M + e. This yields
 





Q(wE + ˜ wm
M)   ˜ wm
M

= 0, which again
generates a contradiction since Q(wE + ˜ wm
M) > ˜ wm
M. It follows that ¯ wc
M < ˜ wm
M, establishing
the claim.
Part (ii): Opportunity cost of capital, r, enters as a multiplicative term with respect to
the credit lines, (1+ r) Li, and the wealth, (1+ r)wi, in the competitive benchmark. When
wE < wc
E and wM < w
¯
c
M, the relevant constraints are given by (8) and (9) in the main
text. Differentiating (8) and (9) with respect to I and r using Cramer’s rule I obtain dI/dr =
 f(¯ LE + ¯ LM)/(1+ r + f   Q0(I)) < 0, where the inequality follows from Lemma A2.
When wE < wc
E and wM > w
¯
c
M, investment is determined by the ﬁrst-order condition
Q0 (I)   (1+ r) = 0, with dI/dr = 1/Q
00
(I) < 0, where the inequality follows from
concavity. Under monopoly, investment is determined by (16) in the main text when wE < wm
E
and wM < w
¯
m
M. The modiﬁed equation reads, Q0(I)   (1+ r + f) = 0, with dI/dr =
1/Q
00
(I) < 0, where the inequality follows from concavity. When wE < wm







the relevant constraints are given by (17) and (18) in the main text. Here, r only
affects the return on the outside option, (1+ r)wi. Differentiating (17) and (18) with respect
to I and r using Cramer’s rule I obtain dI/dr = [awM   (1  a)wE]/f. The derivative
is positive if a > a = wE/(wE + wM). As a 2 (ˆ a,1), it sufﬁces to show that ˆ a  a.
Here, ˆ a = [Q(wE)   wE]/[Q(wE + wM)   (wE + wM)]. Subtracting a from ˆ a yields
[Q(wE)(wE + wM)   Q(wE + wM)wE]/f[Q(wE + wM)   (wE + wM)](wE + wM)g >
0, where the inequality follows from concavity. When wE < wm
E and wM  ¯ wm
M, investment
is determined by the ﬁrst-order condition Q0 (I)   (1+ r) = 0, with dI/dr = 1/Q
00
(I) < 0,
where the inequality follows from concavity.
Proof of Proposition 10
Proof. Part (i): When wE < wc
E and wM < w
¯
c
M in the competitive benchmark, the
relevant constraints are given by (8) and (9) in the main text. Differentiating (8) and (9) with
respect to I and f using Cramer’s rule I obtain dI/df =  fI/[1+ r + f   Q0(I)] < 0,
where the inequality follows from Lemma A2 (r is included to enable a comparison). From
the proof of Proposition 9 I have that dI/dr =  f(¯ LE + ¯ LM)/[1+ r + f   Q0(I)] and so
jdI/dfj > jdI/drj. Under monopoly, investment is determined by (16) in the main text when
wE < wm
E and wM < w
¯
m
M. The modiﬁed equation reads, Q0(I)   (1+ r + f) = 0, with
dI/df = dI/dr = 1/Q
00
(I) < 0. When wE < wm








, I have from the
proof of Proposition 5 (9) that dI/df < 0 (dI/df > 0) and the conclusion follows.
Part (ii): When wE < wc
E and wM < w
¯
c
M in the competitive benchmark, the relevant
constraints are given by (8) and (9) in the main text. Differentiating (8) and (9) with respect
to I, wE, and wM setting dwM =  dwE using Cramer’s rule I obtain dI/dwM = 0. At
ﬁrst best, variation in wE and wM has no effect on investment. Under monopoly, investment is
determined by (16) in the main text when wE < wm
E and wM < w
¯
m
M, with dI/dwi = 0. When
wE < wm








, the relevant constraints are given by (17) and (18) in the
main text. Differentiating (17) and (18) with respect to I, wE, and wM setting dwM =  dwE
using Cramer’s rule I obtain dI/dwM = (1  f)/f > 0, where the inequality follows from
f < 1. At ﬁrst best, variation in wE and wM has no effect on investment.
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